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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Staker Paving and Construction Company, Inc. 
("Staker") appeals a final Summary Judgment, Decree of 
Foreclosure and Order of Sale, issued by the Third Judicial 
District Court in favor of Defendant-Respondent, Foothill Thrift 
& Loan Co. ("Foothill"). The court directed entry of final 
judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Notice of Appeal was made timely, and the Supreme 
Court, pursuant to Rule 4A(a) transferred the case to the Court 
of Appeals for disposition. Notice of the Order of Transfer was 
sent on July 29, 1988, Supreme Court Case No. 880200. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant's statement of issues is unnecessarily 
duplicative. The determinative issues for this Court's review 
are as follows: 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINE 
THAT THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT TO BE DECIDED BETWEEN STAKER AND 
FOOTHILL, CONCERNING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, AND THAT 
FOOTHILL IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW? 
II. AFTER REVIEWING THE FACTS AND INFERENCES 
REASONABLY DRAWN THEREFROM, IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO STAKER, IF A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
FACT NEEDS TO BE DECIDED, SHOULD STAKER BE 
ESTOPPED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, FROM URGING IT 
AGAINST FOOTHILL WHO WAS A BONA FIDE GOOD 
FAITH PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE OF 
ANY CLAIM BY STAKER? 
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CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is set forth in 
the attached Addendum. Pertinent provisions, concerning summary 
judgment, include the following: 
56(c) ...The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.... 
*** 
56(e) Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits.... 
Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-1 (1984) provides: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one 
year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner 
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise 
than by act or operation of law, or by deed 
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the 
party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-3 (1984) provides: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any 
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be 
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void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed 
by the party by whom the lease or sale is to 
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-25-16 (1987), dealing with 
parol evidence of the contents of writings, is attached in its 
entirety in the Addendum. In pertinent part, it provides that 
"[t]here can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other 
than the writing itself, except in the following cases...," none 
of which are similar to the present case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit involves a road construction contract 
between Bagley & Company (Owner) and Staker Paving & Construction 
Co., Inc. (Contractor), for work at the West Jordan Industrial 
Park. It also involves a Uniform Real Estate Contract under 
which Staker is the buyer and Foothill is the seller, covering 
land that is not part of the Industrial Park. Foothill obtained 
the sellerfs interest from West Jordan Properties, a limited 
partnership, of which Gerald H. Bagley ("Bagley") was a general 
partner. Copies of the contracts are included in the attached 
Addendum. 
Staker commenced this lawsuit in November, 1985, 
seeking payment from Bagley, for work performed under the 
construction contract. In the alternative, Staker sought a 
warranty deed from Foothill, claiming accord and satisfaction of 
the real estate contract, by virtue of work performed under the 
construction contract. 
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Staker amended its Complaint to join defendants who own 
or claim an interest in the lands on which the construction work 
was performed. Against those defendants, Staker seeks to execute 
upon mechanic's liens filed for the work performed. 
Foothill counterclaimed for specific performance of the 
uniform real estate contract, because Staker failed and refused 
to make the annual payment required thereunder. Staker claims 
the right to setoff, against the real estate contract, the value 
of construction work which was performed for Bagley & Company but 
not for Foothill or its predecessor, West Jordan Properties. The 
work was not performed on the contract lands, and was not 
performed at Foothill's request, or for its benefit. 
Foothill moved for summary judgment against Staker. 
Following a hearing conducted on November 9, 1987, the lower 
court issued its Order, dated December 11, 1987, granting partial 
summary judgment to Foothill. The court determined that the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract is clear and unambiguous, and that 
there is no evidence that Bagley and Staker intended to modify 
the real estate contract. 
Staker objected to the form of the Order, and a hearing 
was held on December 14, 1987. At the hearing, the court and 
counsel agreed to modify paragraph No. 2 of the Order, to state 
that no parol evidence would be allowed at trial, to modify the 
contract. See Order dated December 16, 1987. 
The court further determined that the contract was not 
modified by the parties' course of dealing, and that there is no 
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lssue of fact, as to Foothill's right to enforce the contract as 
written. The sole issue remaining for trial, as between these 
parties, was to determine the balance owed under the contract as 
of the date when Foothill notified Staker of the assignment. A 
copy of the Court's Orders are included in the attached Addendum. 
Following additional discovery, Foothill brought a 
second motion for summary judgment. The motion was heard on 
April 11, 1988, and granted in favor of Foothill. Summary 
Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure, and Order of Sale was made 
final, and entered on May 3, 1988. A copy of said Judgment, 
Decree and Order is included in the attached Addendum. 
This appeal is limited to a determination of the 
lawsuit as between Foothill and Staker. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In connection with the motions for summary judgment, 
Foothill moved to publish the following depositions. R.281-282. 
Gerald H. Bagley (12-19-86) 
Thomas G. Bagley (6-10-87) 
Richard L. Sorensen (6-10-87) [Controller of Bagley 
entities] 
Larry E. Grant (6-29-87) [Foothill Vice President] 
The depositions were extensively briefed and argued to 
the lower court by both parties. Only the deposition of Larry 
Grant was numbered in the Record. Therefore, pages referenced to 
the remaining depositions are included in the attached Addendum. 
On July 1, 1977, West Jordan Properties, a Bagley 
limited partnership (Seller), entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract with Staker Paving & Construction Co., Inc. (Buyer). 
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The contract required annual payments of $54,572.06, together 
with interest, on July 1 of each year until the balance was fully 
paid. Paragraph 20 of the contract purports to make the 
agreement an integration of all representations, covenants, or 
agreements between the parties. R.19-20. 
While the contract was in force, Gerald H. Bagley 
and/or Bagley-owned entities, contracted with Staker for road and 
pavement work on lands not covered by the real estate contract. 
Sorensen pp.21-22, 79-81. During this period of time 
(1977-1985), the Bagley entities paid millions of dollars to 
Staker, for construction work. G.H.Bagley p.20; Sorensen p.84. 
From time to time—but not every time—when a Bagley 
entity owed Staker for work, or when Staker owed West Jordan 
Properties a payment under the real estate contract, one of the 
parties would request that a trade payment be credited as a 
setoff against the balance owed under the real estate contract. 
Sorensen pp.13-14, 16-29, 51; G.H.Bagley pp. 19-20. Trade 
payments were simply a shortcut to each party's respective 
obligation to pay cash to the other. Sorensen p.60. 
None of the work, performed by Staker, was done for the 
seller under the real estate contract, nor was it performed on 
the contract lands. Sorensen pp.78-79, 82. 
Decisions to allow either party to setoff a trade 
payment, in lieu of a cash payment, were orally agreed to by the 
parties, on a case-by-case basis, and were only documented by 
adjustments in accounting records. Sorensen pp.15, 22-24. 
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Four of the ten setoffs, which the parties agreed upon, 
were the subject of written requests for trade, made by Staker in 
1980. Sorensen Ex. 11. In the letters, Staker asked to be 
informed if the requested setoff was not agreeable to Bagley. 
Id. 
Trade payments were allowed only when both parties 
deemed it to be mutually beneficial and only when mutually 
agreeable. Sorensen pp.10-11, 64-66, 88. Sorensen testified: 
There was no option that one party could 
impose on the other. The option was that it 
could be discussed because the trades were 
never agreed upon unless they were agreed 
upon by both parties. Sorensen pp. 81-82. 
On several occasions, trade payments were unacceptable 
to one or both parties and, therefore, were disallowed. Sorensen 
pp.22, 88. Both parties had occasions to disallow a trade 
payment or setoff against the real estate contract, when 
requested by the other party. Sorensen pp.83-84, pp.21-22, 88; 
T.Bagley p.13. Some trade payments were agreed to in advance, 
and some were agreed to after the work had been performed. 
Sorensen pp. 83-84. 
Neither party had any right to insist that the other 
accept a trade payment. Sorensen p.81-82; T.Bagley p.37. On at 
least one occasion, Bagley was subjected to a financial hardship, 
because Staker refused to allow Bagley a trade payment against 
the real estate contract, and insisted upon cash payment for 
construction work. Sorensen p.22. 
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During the life of the real estate contract, Staker 
paid $215,467.83 in cash, and was allowed to setoff trade 
payments totaling $256,774.23. Sorensen Ex.8; same R.478. 
During the same period of time, Bagley paid millions of dollars 
to Staker, for construction work. Sorensen p.84; G.H.Bagley p. 
20. The amount paid to Staker, for construction work, was far in 
excess of the balance Staker owed under the contract. Sorensen 
p.62. 
On June 13, 1983, Staker entered into a road 
construction contract with Bagley & Company. The work was to be 
performed on lands other than the property covered by the real 
estate contract with West Jordan Properties. Sorensen pp.80-81; 
R.389-394. The construction contract called for money payments 
to be made for the work. No reference was made to trade payments 
or to the 1977 real estate contract. The bid and road 
conscruction contract were prepared by Staker. R.389-394. 
In connection with the road construction contract, 
Staker was paid an advance against work to be performed, in the 
amount of $50,490.73. R.514. However, work was not commenced 
until the following year in October, 1984. R.352 Work was 
suspended on November 15, 1984, and was never completed. Id. 
The work was determined to be unacceptable to the City of West 
Jordan and, therefore, unacceptable to Bagley. G.H.Bagley pp.30, 
39-41, 48-49; Sorensen pp.89-90. Bagley never agreed to a setoff 
for the work. G.H.Bagley p.44. 
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During 1984, Bagley had several loans with Foothill, 
which became delinquent. In early 1985, Foothill and Bagley 
voluntarily agreed to a transaction, whereby Bagley could obtain 
capital by deeding several parcels of real property to Foothill, 
and by assigning the seller's interest in five or six Uniform 
Real Estate Contracts. One of the deeds and assignments covered 
the land and contract, wherein Staker is the purchaser, and which 
is the subject of this appeal. Grant pp.9, 14; Sorensen 
pp.55-59. Copies of the deed and assignment are in the attached 
Addendum. 
Preparatory to the deed and assignment, Foothill 
reviewed the real estate contract and obtained Bagleyfs assurance 
that it was in good standing. Grant pp.18-21; Sorensen pp.61, 
63-64, 91-92; G.H.Bagley pp.44, 74-75. As additional conditions 
precedent to the assignment, Foothill obtained a title report and 
requested a verification of the balance, owed under the contract, 
to be provided by Staker. R.343; Grant pp. 18-21; Sorensen 
pp.61, 63-64, 91-92. 
The title report, covering the real estate contract 
lands, did not reveal any adverse claim by Staker. Grant Ex. 19. 
Sorensen obtained a verification letter from Staker, dated 
February 14, 1985, confirming that the balance owed under the 
real estate contract was $98,471.84. R.491. 
The confirmation letter was provided by Stakerfs 
accountant, Terry White, with whom Sorensen normally dealt. 
Sorensen pp.46-49. Sorensen informed Mr. White that the purpose 
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for obtaining the confirmation letter was preparatory to making 
an assignment of the real estate contract to Foothill. Sorensen 
pp.48-51, 55. No request for a trade payment was made to 
Sorensen, Bagley, or Foothill, at this time. R.343, 353; Grant 
p.29; Sorensen p.34. 
The balance owed under the contract was also evidenced 
by an accounting ledger, prepared by Richard Sorensen, Controller 
for the Bagley entities. Sorensen p.15, Ex. 8. Sorensen 
adjusted the records of West Jordan Properties, to agree with 
Staker's records, concerning the outstanding balance. Sorensen 
pp. 82-83. The ledger sets forth the payment history of the real 
estate contract, including trade payments allowed. R.301. It 
was provided to Foothill in connection with the assignment. 
Sorensen p.31. 
The real estate contract was assigned to Foothill, on 
March 12, 1985, with Bagley's representation and assurance that 
the balance was $98,471.84, and that the contract was in good 
standing. G.H.Bagley pp.74-75; Sorensen pp.61, 91-92; Grant 
pp.27-28; Assignment. 
When the contract was assigned, no construction work 
had been done by Staker that was entitled to be setoff against 
the contract. Sorensen pp.91-92; G.H.Bagley p.44. Furthermore, 
no setoffs were agreed to, or allowed, after the assignment to 
Foothill. Sorensen p.87; G.H.Bagley p.44. 
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In reliance on the-contract terms, the title report, 
the confirmation letter from Staker, and the representations of 
Bagley, Foothill paid approximately $100,000 for the property, 
and for the assignment of the seller's interest in the real 
estate contract. R.343; Grant pp.14-15. The only purpose for 
Foothill's payment of valuable consideration was the expectation 
that the purchaser, Staker, would make the remaining payments, as 
required by the contract. R.343; G.H.Bagley pp.74-75. 
Bagley elected to apply the money, paid by Foothill, to 
reduce his delinquent debts with Foothill. G.H.Bagley p.44; 
Grant p.14. 
On March 21, 1985, Foothill recorded the quit claim 
deed and the assignment of real estate contract. R.302-304. On 
March 22, 1985, Foothill notified Staker in writing, that the 
real estate contract had been assigned, and that all future 
payments should be made directly to Foothill. The notice set 
forth the contract balance of $98,471.84, with interest paid to 
July 9, 1984, and invited any questions by Staker. R.305; Grant 
p.25. Staker remained silent and did not claim any setoff from 
Foothill. R.343, 344, 353. 
Prior to receiving the quit claim deed and assignment 
of real estate contract, Foothill may have determined from the 
ledger sheet, or Sorensen may have told Larry Grant, that Bagley 
and Staker had occasion to allow trade payments to be setoff 
against the contract balance. However, Sorensen never connected 
the real estate contract with any right to demand a trade 
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payment. Sorensen p.51. Furthermore, Bagley testified that he 
would not have discussed trade paymentsf with Foothill, when 
negotiating the sale and assignment; "it wouldn't have been any 
of [their] business." G.H.Bagley p.28. Bagley specifically told 
Foothill that there were no outstanding trade payments. Sorensen 
p.61; G.H.Bagley pp.44, 46, 74-75. 
Foothill had no knowledge, actual or constructive, 
concerning the 1983 construction contract, or the road work 
performed thereunder, on lands not covered by the real estate 
contract. R.343; Grant p.29. Furthermore, Foothill had no 
knowledge of any claim, or agreement, that would entitle Staker 
to a trade payment. R.343; Grant pp.23, 28; Sorensen p.61; G.H. 
Bagley pp.44, 74-75. 
In February, 1985, Staker received a $14,000 payment 
from Tracy Mortgage, and were told that there were no additional 
construction loan monies available for the work. R.352. Despite 
this information, Staker still did not request a trade payment of 
Bagley, or from Foothill. 
On February 14, 1985, Staker recorded a Notice of Lien 
for work performed under the 1983 road construction contract. 
The lands affected by the lien are not covered by the real estate 
contract, and no reference was made to the contract. R.21-22. 
Foothill does not claim an ownership interest in the 
lands on which the construction work was performed; they are 
owned by other defendants in this lawsuit. See Foothill's Answer 
and Counterclaim. The lien is for construction work, and is for 
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the same money that Staker claims as a setof-f against the real 
estate contract. See Stakerfs Amended Complaint. 
According to Staker•s brief, the work was performed 
during September through November (1984) totaling $125,000, of 
which only $14,000 was paid. However, Staker1s own evidence 
shows that all of the work was performed between October 10, 
1984, and November 15, 1984, and that they received an advance 
payment of $50,490.73, in addition to the $14,000 payment. 
R.352, 476; Staker1s response to Interrogatories of Tracy 
Mortgage Company, Response No. 7, dated February 16, 1988. 
Staker first contacted Foothill by phone, on May 15, 
1985, after receiving notice that the assignment had been 
consummated. Staker asked if they would be allowed to setoff a 
trade payment, against the real estate contract, for the 
construction work performed for Bagley, on other lands. Foothill 
refused. R.353; Grant p.41, Ex. 22. A second request was made 
on or about July 26, 1985, in a call made by Mark White of 
Staker, to Larry Grant of Foothill. R.353, 375. By that time, 
Staker was in default under the real estate contract, for failing 
to make the annual payment, due July 1, 1985. 
When Foothill again refused to allow a setoff, Mr. 
White wrote to Stakerfs attorney and told him that Staker would 
not be allowed to make a trade payment on the contract. The 
letter went on to state that it was then Stakerfs main concern, 
to assure that they could obtain clear title to the property, 
upon paying the contract balance. Furthermore, that it was 
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Staker's desire to maintain the payment schedule set forth in the 
contract, unless an accelerated payment was required. R.306. 
Staker failed and refused to pay the contract payment 
to Foothill. R.344. 
On August 13, 1985, five months following the deed and 
assignment to Foothill/ Staker wrote to Bagley and said, "This 
letter is to inform you that we have elected to offset monies 
owed us by Mr. Bagley against all monies owed on the referenced 
[real estate] contract." R.387-388. Staker had known for months 
chat Bagley had deeded the property and assigned the contract to 
Foothill. Bagley did not think he had any right to allow a 
setoff to Foothill's interest, and he did not agree to a trade. 
G.fl.Bagley pp.44, 46, 74-75; Sorensen pp.74,87. 
In addition, the construction work performed by Staker 
had not been approved by the City of West Jordan; nor had Bagley 
accepted the work for payment under the road construction 
contract. G.H.Bagley pp.30-31, 39-41; T.Bagley pp.32-33; 
Sorensen pp.89-90. 
Foothill sent a formal Notice of Default to Staker, 
which was duly recorded. Grant Ex.20. Whereupon, Staker 
initiated this lawsuit in November, 1985. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
The lower court correctly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Foothill, against Staker, because there is no credible 
evidence that a genuine issue of material fact remains to be 
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decided between them, and Foothill is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
The Court determined that the subject real estate 
contract is clear and unambiguous. Furthermore, the Court 
determined that there is no evidence that the contract was 
modified, or that Staker and Bagley intended to modify the 
contract, prior to Foothill's purchase. 
The Court streamlined the remaining issue for trial 
between Staker and Foothill and, in so doing, determined that no 
parol evidence would be allowed at trial to modify the contract. 
The court's ruling is in harmony with the statutes of 
fraud, which require real property contracts to be in writing, or 
they are unenforceable. In addition, the parol evidence rule 
precludes parol evidence of the contents of a writing. 
The Appellate Court is not bound by the lower court's 
determinations of questions of law. It should apply the same 
analytical approach in reviewing the facts, and reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to 
Staker. 
There is no credible evidence that raises a genuine 
issue of material fact between Staker and Foothill. Staker 
incorrectly urges application of the "doctrine of practical 
construction", in support of its claim that the course of dealing 
between Bagley and Staker, rendered the real estate contract 
ambiguous, and constituted a modification. This argument is 
untenable. First, the doctrine is inapplicable because the real 
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estate contract is clear and unambiguous. Second, the conduct of 
the parties does not demonstrate that the contract is ambiguous. 
Third, there is no evidence that Bagley and Staker had the 
requisite intent to modify the contract. Fourth, the evidence 
fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact between Foothill 
and Staker. 
The course of dealing between Staker and Bagley, 
whereby they allowed intermittent trade payments to be setoff 
against the real estate contract, does not demonstrate the 
requisite intent to modify the real estate contract. The parties 
never discussed, or agreed, to modify the contract's payment 
provision as to future performance. Trade payments were merely a 
shortcut to each parties' respective obligation to make a cash 
payment to the other. Either party could request a trade payment 
be applied, but neither party could insist that the other accept 
the setoff. 
The only affidavits submitted by Staker, in opposition 
to Foothill's motions for summary judgment, are the Affidavit and 
Supplemental Affidavit of William Fillmore. Foothill moved to 
strike those affidavits on the grounds that Mr. Fillmore was 
incompetent to testify to the matters stated therein, and that 
the affidavits were otherwise insufficient. The lower court did 
not expressly rule on Foothill's motions to strike, and Foothill 
reasserts its objections on the grounds stated in its motions of 
record. 
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Even if the testimony of Mr. Fillmore is considered to 
be credible evidence, it does not demonstrate that there exists 
an issue of material fact which would preclude Foothill from 
summary judgment for specific performance of the real estate 
contract. 
Foothill purchased the land and was assigned the 
seller's interest in the real estate contract for valuable 
consideration. At the time of the assignment, Foothill had no 
knowledge, actual or constructive, that Bagley and Staker had 
entered into the 1983 road construction contract for work on 
different lands. Even if Foothill had known about the 
construction work performed by Staker, a setoff would still be 
inappropriate, because there was no mutual agreement to allow the 
work to be a setoff against the real estate contract. Moreover, 
Staker did not claim a setoff, until after they received notice 
of the assignment to Foothill. 
If there is an issue of fact, concerning modification 
of the real estate contract, it is a dispute between Bagley and 
Staker. It does not create a genuine issue of material fact 
between Foothill and Staker. Bagley is not a party to this 
appeal. 
II. 
Although this court's affirmance of the first issue, 
would be dispositive of this matter, should the Court find that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact to be decided between 
Foothill and Staker, concerning Staker's claim for a contract 
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setoff, the Court should determine, as a matter of law, that 
Staker has precluded itself from urging the claim against 
Foothill. 
As conditions precedent to purchasing the real 
property, and receiving assignment of the real estate contract, 
Foothill obtained a title report covering the land. There are no 
adverse claims by Staker, filed of record as to these lands. 
In addition, Foothill required a confirmation letter of 
the contract balance, to be provided by Staker. Staker provided 
the confirmation letter on February 14, 1985, prior to the 
assignment. 
As further precautions, Foothill reviewed the terms of 
the real estate contract, and obtained Bagley's assurance that 
the contract was in good standing and that future payments could 
be expected in accordance with the contract terms and conditions. 
Prior to the transaction, Foothill had no knowledge, 
whatsoever, thac Staker had performed work on other lands, which 
it would later claim as a setoff to the real estate contract. 
On March 21, 1985, Foothill recorded the Quit Claim 
Deed and the Assignment of Real Estate Contract. On March 22, 
1985, Foothill sent proper notice to Staker, informing them to 
send future payments directly to Foothill, and inviting any 
questions Staker might have had. Staker first contacted Foothill 
on May 15, 1985, and asked to be allowed a setoff for the 
construction work which was performed for Bagley on different 
lands. 
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As a bona fide, good faith purchaser for value, without 
notice of the claimed setoff, Foothill should not be subject to 
Staker's claim. The construction work was totally unrelated to 
the real estate contract. Furthermore, Staker's claim for 
payment had not yet matured because of a dispute with Bagley over 
negligent performance. 
Bagley testified that he had not agreed to modify the 
contract and that he had not agreed to Staker's claimed setoff. 
Staker's own conduct demonstrates that they did not intend to 
modify the contract. They never sought a written modification of 
the real estate contract; they failed to reference the real 
estate contract when preparing the construction contract; they 
failed to speak up after being notified that Bagley intended to 
assign the contract to Foothill; and they failed to claim a 
setoff until months after the assignment was consummated. 
Staker subsequently expressed a desire to maintain the payment 
schedule set forth in the contract. 
Prior to the assignment, Staker was advised that a 
construction loan for the work had been depleted. Despite this 
information, and their belief that Bagley was cash poor, Staker 
still did not seek a setoff for their work. Instead, they chose 
to let the contract interest accrue on the balance they owed. 
This, they claim, was because the next payment was not due until 
July. However, the majority of trade payments were not made in 
June or July. It was contrary to their best interest to not 
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immediately seek a setoff—if they genuinely believed they were 
entitled. 
The real estate contract was freely assignable, and 
neither Bagley nor Foothill had any duty to obtain Staker1s 
permission prior to the assignment. When Staker received notice 




Appellant-Staker has mischaracterized the testimony of 
deponents, and otherwise misconstrued the evidence, attempting to 
give the appearance that there are issues of fact as between 
Staker and Foothill. However, there is no credible evidence that 
raises a genuine issue of material fact that needs to be decided 
between them, and Foothill is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Staker contends that the lower court refused to accept 
parol evidence concerning the course of dealing between Bagley 
and Staker, prior to the real estate contract being assigned to 
Foothill. This is not true. Depositions, interrogatories, 
contracts, correspondence, accounting records, and affidavits 
were presented for consideration. The parties' course of dealing 
is undisputed, and was extensively documented and submitted to 
the court in the hearings for summary judgment. The court did 
not "weigh" the evidence, as that would be improper in resolving 
a motion for summary judgment. What the court did was to 
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determine that the evidence failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact, between Staker and Foothill. 
In streamlining the dispute between Staker and 
Foothill, the lower court granted partial summary judgment to 
Foothill and determined, as a matter of law, that parol evidence 
would not be allowed at trial, to alter or modify the express 
terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. R.413-416; 418-421. 
After additional discovery, the remaining issue was similarly 
determined to be undisputed. R.553-558. 
This Court is not bound by the lower court's 
determinations of questions of law. In a recent pronouncement of 
its standard for review of a summary judgment, Lucky Seven Radio 
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1988) at 752, this court 
stated that its duty is to apply the analytical standard required 
of the trial court, and to liberally construe the facts and view 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, if there is a dispute 
as to a material issue of fact, the summary judgment should be 
reversed and the matter remanded for a trial on that issue. 
Id. However, in the present case, there is no credible evidence, 
which raises a genuine issue of material fact to be decided, 
concerning Foothill's right to enforce the real estate contract 
as written. 
The primary purpose of summary judgment, is to pierce 
the allegations of the pleadings, and show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party was 
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dupler v. Yates, 351 
P.2d 624, 636 (Utah 1960) . 
"Summary judgment is appropriate whenever the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c)." Briqqs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 
1987) at 283. 
Staker appeals the lower court's determination that 
parol evidence would be inadmissible to alter the real estate 
contract. This ruling is in accord with Utah's statutes of 
fraud, Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-1, and Section 25-5-3 (1984), 
which require real property agreements to be in writing, or they 
are unenforceable. 
Furthermore, the ruling was in accord with Utah's parol 
evidence rule, Utah Ann. Section 78-25-16 (1987), which precludes 
parol evidence of the contents of a writing. 
The intended purpose of such statutes, has been stated 
to be as follows: 
The provisions of the statute of frauds 
applicable to contracts affecting interests 
in land were adopted for the purpose of 
preventing existing estates in land from 
being upset by parol evidence, and to 
preserve the title to real property from the 
chances, the uncertainty, and the fraud, 
attending the admission of parol testimony. 
72 Am. Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, Sec. 44. 
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The only documentary evidence, advanced and claimed by 
Staker to demonstrate the alleged contract modification, are four 
letters sent by Staker to Bagley in 1980. In those letters, 
Staker asked to allowed setoffs, for certain trade payments, and 
to be informed if the setoffs were unacceptable. R.477, 478, 
483, 485-487. All of the trade payments were documented by 
accounting ledgers prepared by Bagley and Staker. These 
documents fall short of memorializing an agreement to modify 
future performance under the real estate contract. 
Staker also contends that the real estate contract was 
rendered ambiguous and modified, by the parties allowing trade 
payments. They present, as legal authority, language of the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of P.L.C. Landscape Const, v. 
Piccadilly Fish 'N Chips, Inc., 502 P.2d 562 (Utah 1972). 
However, a very relevant portion of the quotation was omitted 
from Appellant's brief, and is underlined below: 
Except where a change, modification or 
addition to a contract may conflict with the 
well-recognized rule against varying a 
written contract by parol, there is nothing 
so sacrosanct about having entered into one 
agreement that it will prevent the parties 
entering into any such change, modification, 
extension or addition to their arrangement 
for doing business with each other that they 
may mutually agree. 502 P.2d at 563 
(emphasis added). 
It would be improper to allow parol evidence to modify 
the real estate contract. There is no evidence that Staker and 
Bagley mutually intended to modify the real estate contract. 
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Moreover, the evidence does not even raise a genuine issue of 
fact, concerning this matter. 
This Court recently considered whether or not parol 
evidence should be allowed to modify a broker's commission 
agreement in connection with the sale of real property. C. J. 
Realty, Inc. v. Willeg, 86 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Utah App. 1988) 
The Court determined that, when a contract is ambiguous, parol 
evidence should be allowed, and factual findings made for the 
purpose of determining the intent of the parties. The Court 
explained that: 
A contract is considered ambiguous if "the 
words used to express the meaning and 
intention of the parties are insufficient: in 
a sense that the contract may be understood 
to reach two or more plausible meanings." 
(Cite omit.) 
C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 86 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Utah App. 
1988) at 36. 
Furthermore, in the case of Metro. Prop. & Liability v. 
Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 1988) at page 257, the Court 
observed that: 
Language is considered ambiguous if "the 
words used to express the meaning and 
intention of the parties are insufficient in 
a sense that the contract may be understood 
to reach two or more plausible meanings." 
(Cite omit.) 
In the present case, neither the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract nor the road construction contract, considered 
separately or together, contain language or terms that are 
ambiguous. 
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Staker next contends that, although the real estate 
contract is unambiguous as written, it was rendered ambiguous and 
modified by the course of dealing between Bagley and Staker. 
They rely on application of the "doctrine of practical 
construction" to show that the parties course of dealing, 
modified the contract. This reliance is misplaced. 
It would be inappropriate to apply the doctrine in the 
case before this Court. "The doctrine of practical construction 
can only be applied when the contract is ambiguous, and cannot be 
used when the contract is unambiguous." Bullough v. Simms, 400 
P.2d 20, 23 (Utah 1965); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 
266, 271 (Utah 1972). Furthermore, the existence, and the 
resolution, of contract ambiguities, are questions of law for the 
court. Morris v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 
658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983) at p. 1200. 
The "doctrine of practical construction" is based upon 
the common sense concept that "actions speak louder than words." 
In the present case, there was no conduct by the parties which 
indicated they intended to modify the payment provision of the 
real estate contract. All of the evidence is to the contrary. 
Bagley1s testimony clearly demonstrates that he did not 
contemplate, or intend, to modify the contract. G.H.Bagley 
pp.22-23, 44. 
Stakerfs own conduct demonstrates that they did not 
intend to modify the contract as to future performance. They did 
not seek to modify the contract in writing. They did not include 
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any reference to the contract when they prepared the bid and 
construction contract. 
Trade payments were allowed only on a case-by-case 
basis, and only when mutually beneficial and agreed to by Bagley 
and Staker. Both parties had occasion to deny the other a right 
to setoff a trade payment against the real estate contract. On 
at least one occasion, Staker requested that only a portion of 
the money they were owed for construction work, be applied to the 
real estate contract, the balance to be paid in cash. Sorensen 
Ex. 11. 
Staker did not attempt to accelerate payment of the 
contract balance, as allowed by the contract terms, even after 
learning that the applicable construction loan, had been 
exhausted. R.352-353. If the payment provision of the contract 
had been modified, as claimed by Staker, the remaining balance 
could have been satisfied many times over, by their demanding 
trade payments for construction work. 
Staker did not approach Foothill, to request a setoff, 
until after receiving notice of the assignment to Foothill. In 
fact, Staker did not notify Bagley of Staker's intention to 
setoff a trade payment, until August 13, 1985, five months 
following the assignment. R.387-388. At that time, Bagley and 
Staker were still in disagreement as to whether or not the work 
had been performed by Staker in accordance with the construction 
contract. G.H.Bagley pp. 30-31, 39-41; Sorensen pp. 89-90; 
T.Bagley pp. 32-33. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has consistently recognized that 
one of the essential incidents of a contract is mutuality of 
agreement or mutuality of obligation. With respect to contract 
modifications, the Court has said: 
It is true the parties to a written contract 
may modify, waive, or make new contractual 
terms, even if the contract itself contains a 
provision to the contrary. (Cite omit.) 
However, the minds of the parties must have 
met upon an asserted contract modification. 
(Cite omit.) 
Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 
1979) . 
Despite counsel's argument to the contrary, there is no 
evidence that Staker and Bagley had a meeting of the minds, 
concerning a modification of the real estate contract, as to 
future performance. More important, for purposes of this appeal, 
there is no evidence that raises an issue of fact between Staker 
and Foothill. 
In defense to Foothill's request for specific 
performance of the real estate contract, Staker claimed accord 
and satisfaction, by virtue of its construction work. However, 
there is no credible evidence that Bagley and Staker had even 
discussed, much less reached agreement, to an accord and 
satisfaction. 
In the case of Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Min., Inc., 
740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987), the Court said: 
[B]efore an accord and satisfaction can 
arise, there must be an offer and acceptance 
and a meeting of the minds. (Cite omit) 
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An accord and satisfaction arises when the 
parties to a contract mutually agree that 
a different performance than that required 
by the original contract will be in 
substitution of the performance originally 
agreed upon and that the substituted 
agreement calling for the different 
performance will discharge the obligation 
created under the original agreement (Cite 
omit) 740 P.2d 1308. 
The only affidavits submitted by Staker, in opposition 
to Foothills1 motions for summary judgment, are the Affidavit, 
and Supplemental Affidavit, of William Fillmore. R.350-359, 
496-515. Foothill objected to the introduction of such 
affidavits and moved to have them stricken. R.357-394, 527-533. 
The lower court did not expressly rule on Foothill's motions to 
strike the affidavits, and Foothill reasserts its objections to 
the affidavits, on the grounds set forth in its memorandums of 
record. Id. 
The affidavits are insufficient under Rule 56(e), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires affidavits to be based 
on personal knowledge, and to set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence. This Court has aptly observed as 
follows: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that 
affidavits in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment "shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be.admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. (Cite omit.) 
Bruno v. Plateau Min. Co., 747 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1987) at 
1056. In that case, the Court affirmed summary judgment for an 
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employer, against an employee's claim that a course of dealing 
had modified an employment-at-will relationship. The Court said: 
An implied contract altering the employment 
employment-at-will relationship, like other 
contracts implied-in-fact, would require 
actions or conduct manifesting the mutual 
assent of both parties to be bound by the 
certain terms of their bargain. See Fowler 
v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976). 
747 P.2d at 1058. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that an Affidavit 
must be based on the affiant's personal knowledge, and that an 
affidavit based merely on his unsubstantiated opinions and 
beliefs is insufficient. Treloggan v. Treloqgan, 699 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1985). 
Hearsay testimony and opinion testimony that would not 
be admissable if testified at the trial may not properly be set 
forth in an affidavit supporting a summary judgment. Walker v. 
Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973). 
Furthermore, statements in an affidavit which are largely 
conclusory in form may not be considered on summary judgment 
under subdivision (e) of Rule 56. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 
857 (Utah 1983). An affidavit which merely reflects the 
affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions, and which fails to state 
evidentiary facts, is insufficient to create an issue of fact. 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
Mr. Fillmore's testimony is not based on personal 
knowledge; he lacks personal knowledge of the facts to which he 
testified; his testimony is contrary to prior admissions by 
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Staker; and his affidavits are otherwise inadmissible insofar as 
they contain hearsay and opinion testimony, and are primarily 
conclusory in form. Moreover, his testimony is unsubstantiated 
and contradicted by the evidence. 
Mr. Fillmore testifies concerning discussions and 
transactions to which he was not a party; some of which, he 
states, took place more than two years before his employment by 
Staker. R.351, 499. 
Mr. Fillmore testifies that trade payments were not 
made on projects, such as the Jeremy Ranch, when Bagley had 
arranged financing for the work. R. 351. He also states that 
Staker performed the construction work at the West Jordan 
Industrial Park, only with Bagley's assurance that it could be 
setoff as a trade payment. R. 352. 
This testimony is directly contradicted by the 
evidence. At least two of the trade payments were for work at 
the Jeremy Ranch. Sorensen Exs.8, 11. Furthermore, Fillmore 
contradicts himself by admitting that there was construction 
financing for the work at the Industrial Park, at the time when 
he claims Bagley assured them that a setoff would be allowed. 
R.352, 500. 
Foothill believes, that even if the Affidavit and 
Supplemental Affidavit of William Fillmore are considered by this 
Court, as credible evidence, the testimony therein fails to 
demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue of material fact to 
defeat Foothill's summary judgment. For example, he admits that 
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Foothill was not contacted by Staker, and asked to allow a 
setoff, until after Staker received notice of the assignment. 
R.353, 501. 
When Staker was notified in February, 1985, that there 
was only $14,000 remaining for construction financing, Fillmore 
states that Staker elected to not claim a setoff until the July 
1, 1985, payment came due. R. 352. This is further evidence 
that Stakerfs claimed setoff had not matured prior to the real 
estate contract being assigned to Foothill. It is curious that 
Staker chose to suffer accruing interest, despite Bagley's 
alleged assurance that they would be allowed a setoff. The 
majority of the trade payments were not done on or about July 1 
of the calendar year. R.512. Bagley directly refutes that there 
was an agreement to allow the setoff. G.H.Bagley p.28; Sorensen 
p. 61. 
II 
Although Foothill believes that the course of dealing, 
between Staker and Bagley, lacked the requisite intent to modify 
the real estate contract, if there is an issue of fact, it is 
between Staker and Bagley. In addition, Staker has precluded 
itself from urging such fact against Foothill who is a bona fide, 
good faith purchaser of the land and real estate contract. 
Staker contends that the assignment from West Jordan 
Properties, placed Foothill in the "same shoes" as Bagley & Co., 
a stranger to the real estate contract. This argument is 
untenable. 
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The general rule "that an assignee can acquire no 
rights superior to those held by his assignor is not without 
exceptions•" 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments, Section 103; 3 
Williston, Contracts 3d ed. Section 432. 
Some of the exceptions to the general rule arose from 
fact situations that were similar to the facts now before this 
court. For example, courts have disallowed setoffs when the 
claim was unrelated to the assigned contract, or when the claim 
had not matured at the time of the assignment. 
Furthermore, the general rule that "the assignee takes 
an assignment subject to all equities and defenses then existing 
against the instrument assigned,... is subject to the 
qualification that the debtor has not by his conduct waived, or 
estopped himself to assert, any counterdemands he may have had 
against the assignor." 51 ALR 2d 886, at 889. The courts have 
frequently estopped a debtor from claiming setoffs against an 
assignee when the debtor's acts of omission or commission were 
similar to those of Staker in this case. Id. 
For example, if a debtor is entitled to claim a setoff, 
he is under a duty to "speak up" when notified of an assignment. 
When he remains silent, he is estopped from subsequently raising 
the claim. In the present case, Staker failed to contact 
Foothill, when Sorensen notified Staker of the pending 
assignment, but waited until months thereafter. R.353, 501; 
Sorensen pp.48-51, 55. 
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Debtors have also been estopped from advancing claims 
which are contrary to their prior representations. In the 
present case, Staker confirmed the balance owed under the real 
estate contract, after performing the road construction work, and 
prior to the assignment. R.301. Months after the assignment was 
consummated, Staker indicated that it desired to maintain the 
payment schedule set forth in the contract. R.306. 
Debtors have also been estopped from asserting setoffs 
against an assignee, that did not exist, or mature, prior to the 
assignment. In the present case, Bagley and Staker had never 
reached agreement on whether or not the construction work had 
been satisfactorily performed by Staker, in accordance with the 
construction contract. G.H.Bagley pp.30, 39-40. 
Staker did not request to be allowed a credit for a 
trade payment until months after being notified of the 
assignment. R.353, 501. Even if Staker was entitled to claim a 
setoff against Bagley, they should now be estopped, as a matter 
of law, from advancing the claim against Foothill. 
The statutory authority cited in Staker1s brief, in 
support of its right to claim a setoff against Foothill, is 
inapplicable. U.C.A. 70A-9-318 (1953) advanced by Staker, 
discusses certain defenses that an account debtor may setoff 
against an assignee following an assignment of a secured 
transaction. However, Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-9-104 (1980) 
makes Chapter 9 of Utahfs Uniform Commercial Code inapplicable to 
the type of assignment, which is the subject of this lawsuit, 
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and to factual situations similar to the undisputed facts of this 
case. U.C.A. Section 70A-9-318 does not apply: to transfer of a 
right to payment under a contract to an assignee who is also to 
do the performance under the contract; or to any right of setoff; 
or to the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real 
estate. Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-9-104 (f), (i), and (j) 
(1980). 
The concept that an assignee stands in the same shoes 
of his assignor developed in commercial transactions. In cases 
involving the assignment of real property, when the courts have 
had occasion to apply the general rule, the issue consistently 
focused on the quality and extent of the property title which the 
assignor was capable of assigning. See for example, Wiscombe v. 
Lockhart Co., 608 P.2d 236 (Utah 1980). In the present case, 
there is no dispute over the quality or extent of Bagley's title 
to the real estate, conveyed to Foothill. 
Staker should not be allowed to claim a setoff against 
Foothill, for construction work performed on lands not covered by 
the real estate contract. Similarly, Foothill would not be 
entitled to claim a setoff against Staker for the allegedly 
negligent work, performed on different lands, for the benefit of 
Bagley and other land owners. 
Staker claims that Foothill knew, or should have known, 
that Bagley had occasion to allow trade payments. However, 
whether or not Foothill knew that Staker and Bagley had 
intermittently allowed trade payments, is immaterial. The 
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significant facts are undisputed. Foothill had no notice, actual 
or constructive, of the 1983 road construction contract, and the 
work performed thereunder. Foothill gave valuable consideration 
in reliance on: the title report; the terms and conditions of 
the real estate contract; the confirmation letter from Staker; 
the accounting ledger; the representations and assurances of 
Bagley; and the silence of Staker, concerning setoffs. R.343. 
Foothill was a bona fide purchaser for value of the 
real property, without notice of any defects or claim by Staker. 
It has been declared that the soundest 
reasons of justice and policy demand that 
every reasonable intendment should be made to 
support the titles of bona fide purchasers of 
real property, and that no equity can be any 
stronger than that of a purchaser who has put 
himself in peril by purchasing a title for a 
valuable consideration without notice of any 
defect in it. 
77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, Section 633. 
With respect to an obligor's duty to honor an 
assignment by an obligee, the Utah Supreme Court has said: 
When an obligee has acquired the right to 
receive money, it is his prerogative to 
assign it to whomever he selects; it is not 
essential that the debtor agree to the 
arrangement. When the obligor receives 
proper notice of the assignment, he must 
honor it. 
Time Finance Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., 450 P.2d 873, 875 
(Utah 1969). 
CONCLUSION 
Foothill respectfully asks the Court to affirm the 
lower court's Summary Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure, and Order 
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of Sale, or otherwise to determine, as a matter of law, that 
Staker's Complaint fails to state a cause of action against 
Foochill, and that summary judgment should have been granted, as 
a matter of law, on Foothill's Counterclaim against Staker. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ZcS day of September, 
1988. 
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C. 
MEL S. MARTIN 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Foothill Thrift & Loan Co. 
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ADDENDUM 
I. STATUTES & RULES 
II. ORDERS OF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
III. CONTRACTS, ASSIGNMENT, DEED 
IV. CORRESPONDENCE 
V. DEPOSITION Gerald R. Bagley 
VI. DEPOSITION Thomas G. Bagley 
VII. DEPOSITION Richard L. Sorensen 
I. STATUTES & RULES 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 25-5-1 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING WOOL 
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102) 
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed. 
Repeal. 33-4-3), relating to the marketing of wool, 
Sections 25-4-1 to 25-4-3 (L 1931, ch. 54, w e r e repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102. 
§§1 to 4; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-4-1 to 
CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written, and subscribed. 
25-5-5. Representation as. to credit of third person. 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another — When not required to be in writing. 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principaL 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. No estate or interest in 
real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating 
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared other-
wise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974, 
2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 33-5-1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statute, Comp. Laws 
1876, § 1010. 
Cross-References. 
Contract for sale of goods for $500 or more 
unenforceable in absence of some writing, 
70A-2-201. 
Enforceability of security interests, 
70A-9-203. 
Securities sales, statute of frauds for con-
tracts, 70A-8-319. 
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal 
property not otherwise covered, 70A-1-206. 
Construction and application. 
This section does not apply unless there is 
a contract Skeen v. Van Sickle (1932) 80 U 
419,15 P 2d 344. 
The meaning of the word "interest" in this 
section depends on statutory construction 
governed by legislative intent In re Reyn-
olds' Estate (1936) 90 U 415, 62 P 2d 270. 
Sale implies creation of an estate in excess 
of a leasehold, by act of the owner. Lewis v. 
Dahl (1945) 108 U 486,161 P 2d 362,160 ALR 
1040. 
Adjoining landowners. 
The statute of frauds applies to adjacent 
landowners, as well as to persons who are 
not so situated. Tripp v. Bagley (1928) 74 U 
57, 276 P 912, 69 ALR 1417, distinguished in 
10 U 2d 370, 353 P 2d 911. 
Agent's authority. 
Where, at time agreement for purchase of 
land was entered into, there was no statute 
requiring agent's authority to contract for 
purchase of real estate to be in writing, con-
tract would not be invalidated. Le Vine v. 
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fraud or the violation of a duty imposed 
under a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 
Hawkins v. Perry (1953) 123 U 16, 253 P 2d 
372. 
Where defendant altered a certificate of 
sale of land by inserting his own name as 
purchaser and the land was not included in 
the decedent's estate which was distributed 
in 1924, there was a constructive trust tor the 
benefit of the decedent's heirs and the estate 
could be reopened. Perry v. McConkie (1953) 
1 U 2d 189, 264 P 2d 852. 
A deed given to secure a debt, though abso-
lute in form, was in equity a mortgage, so 
that a trust was created by operation of law 
and, under the express language of this sec-
tion, was not prevented by 25-5-1. Taylor v. 
Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 39, 492 P 2d 1343. 
Parol evidence may be introduced to prove 
a constructive trust or resulting trust since 
they arise by operation of law and are 
expressly excluded from the statute of frauds 
by this section. In re Estate of Hock (1982) 
655 P 2d 1111. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §2463; 
C.L. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-5-3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statute, 2 Comp. Laws 
1888, § 3918(5). 
Agent's authority. 
In action for specific performance of con-
tract for sale of real property, held in 
absence of evidence showing defendant's 
agent was authorized in writing to sell real 
property or equities taking case out of stat-
ute of frauds, trial court properly granted 
motion for dismissal of action. Lee v. 
Polyhrones (1921) 57 U 401,195 P 201. 
Wills. 
When will is sought to be maintained also 
as a contract, it must satisfy this and suc-
ceeding sections of the statute of frauds. 
Ward v. Ward (1938) 96 U 263, 85 P 2d 635. 
Collateral References. 
Applicability of statute of frauds to con-
tracts to surrender, rescind or abandon 
trusts, 106 ALR 1313,173 ALR 281. 
Character and validity of instrument as 
contract as affected by provision for post-
mortem payment or performance, 1 ALR 2d 
1178. 
Decedent's agreement to devise, bequeath, 
or leave property as compensation for ser-
vices, 106 ALR 742. 
Enforceability, as regards proceeds of sale 
of property, of real estate trust that does not 
satisfy statute of frauds, 154 ALR 385. 
Grantee's oral promise to grantor as giving 
rise to trust, 159 ALR 997. 
Trust arising by grantee's oral promise to 
grantor, 35 ALR 280, 45 ALR 851, 80 ALR 
195,129 ALR 689,159 ALR 997. 
If there is no contract there cannot, of 
course, arise any question as to a require-
ment that it should be in writing and sub-
scribed by the party or his agent. Skeen v. 
Van Sickle (1932) 80 U 419,15 P 2d 344. 
Where real estate agents had no express or 
implied authority under listing agreement to 
execute contract of sale of real estate on 
behalf of vendors, latter were not bound by 
the terms of an earnest money agreement. 
Frandsen v. Gerstner (1971) 26 U 2d 180, 487 
P 2d 697. 
There is no requirement that the agent of 
the lessee or assignee be authorized in writ-
ing to execute the lease or assignment. Zeese 
v. Estate of Siegel (1975) 534 P 2d 85. 
Introduction of parol evidence was proper 
to show that agent who made contract in his 
own name was acting for corporate principal, 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Trusts. though absolute in form, if given to secure a 
Trusts arising by implication or operation debt, is in equity treated as a mortgage — 
of law are expressly excluded from the effects a trust by operation of law. Wasatch Min. Co. 
of the statute; and a deed of conveyance, v. Jennings (1887) 5 U 243,15 P 65. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. Every contract for 
the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, 
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note 
or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom 




annexed to a copy of the document or notice, specifying the times when, and 
the paper in which, the publication was made. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Summons, proof of publication, Rules of Civil 
Supp., 104-25-14. Procedure, Rule 4(g). 
Cross-References. — Probate notices, pub-
lication in newspapers, § 75-1-404. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 31. 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. Notice § 21. 
Key Numbers. — Notice *» 14. 
78-25-15. Filing of affidavit — Original or certified copy as 
evidence. 
If such affidavit is made in an action or special proceeding pending in a 
court, it may be filed with the court or clerk thereof. If not so made, it may be 
filed with the recorder of the county where the newspaper is published. In 
either case the original affidavit, or a copy thereof certified by the judge of the 
court or officer having it in custody, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated 
therein. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; 'C. 1943, for copies furnished by party, Rules of Civil 
Supp., 104-25-15. Procedure, Rule 77(e). 
Cross-References. — Officer not to charge 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 31. 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. Notice § 21. 
78-25-16. Parol evidence of contents of writings — When 
admissible. 
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the writing 
itself, except in the following cases: 
(1) when the original has been lost or destroyed, in which case proof of 
the loss or destruction must first be made. 
(2) when the original is in the possession of the party against whom the 
evidence is offered and he fails to produce it after reasonable notice. 
(3) when the original is a record or other document in the custody of a 
public officer. 
(4) when the original has been recorded, and the record or a certified 
copy thereof is made evidence by this code or other statute. 
(5) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other docu-
ments which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and 
the evidence sought from them is only the general result of the whole. 
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member of a profession or 
calling, or any department or agency of government, in the regular course of 
business or activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, 
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print, representation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occur-
rence or event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of 
the same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic, photo-
static, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic, or other process which 
accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the origi-
nal, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless its 
preservation is required by law; and such reproduction, when satisfactorily 
identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or 
administrative proceeding whether the original is in existence or not, an 
enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in evi-
dence if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection 
under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement 
or facsimile, does not preclude admission of the original. 
In the cases mentioned in Subdivisions (3) and (4), a copy of the original, or 
of the record, must be produced; in those mentioned in Subdivisions (1) and 
(2), either a copy or oral evidence of the contents. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-25-16; L. 1983, ch.165, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment deleted "unless held m a custodial or fi-
duciary capacity or" before "unless its preser-
vation is required" m the first sentence of the 
second paragraph. 
Cross-References. — Abstracts of title ad-
missible m evidence, § 1-1-15. 
Best evidence rule, when secondary evidence 
admissible, Rules of Evidence, Rules 1002, 
1004, 1006, 1008. 
Contents of writing proven by testimony, de-
position or written admission of party against 
whom it is offered, Rules of Evidence, Rule 
1007. 
Statute of frauds, § 25-5-1 et seq. 
Summaries of writings as proof of contents, 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 1006. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Original in possession of adverse party. 
Secondary evidence. 
Summary of noncomplicated exhibits. 
Original in possession of adverse party. 
Testimony concerning the defendant com-
pany's records was properly admitted into evi-
dence as an exception to the best evidence rule 
where the president of the defendant company, 
who had custody of the records, refused to 
grant access to the records and had left the 
state so the records could not be produced, and 
the plaintiff had made an attempt to produce 
the records. Meyer v General Am. Corp., 569 
P 2d 1094 (Utah 1977). 
Secondary evidence. 
Where records should have been kept, and 
are not produced, the court should look with 
extreme caution upon secondary evidence. Ste-
vens v. Gray, 123 Utah 395, 259 P.2d 889 
(1953). 
Summary of noncomplicated exhibits. 
Where exhibits attempted to be summarized 
are neither so numerous nor so complicated 
that they could not be individually examined 
and appraised by the jury, the trial court was 
within its discretion m refusing to admit a 
proffered summary into evidence. Shupe v. 
Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 (1966). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 30 Am. Jur.. 2d Evidence 
§ 1016 et seq.; 52 Am. Jur. 2d Lost or De-
stroyed Instruments § 59. 
C.J.S. — 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 851 et seq.; 
54 C J.S. Lost Instruments § 13. 
Key Numbers. — Evidence *» 176 et seq.; 
Lost Instruments *» 8(2). 
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and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213. 
C.J.S.— 49 CJ.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
AJLR. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L JL3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom,- 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 92 to 134. 
Rule 56, Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
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trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial jshall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall' be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 





—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Sufficiency. 





70A-9-104 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Security interest, assignment, duties of Conflict of laws as to chattel mortgages 
filing officer, 70A-9-405. and conditional sales of chattels, 13 ALR 2d 
Territorial application of act, 70A-1-105. 1312. 
Constitutionality, construction, and appli-
Collateral References-
 c a £ i o n o f s t a t u t e respecting sale, assignment 
Secured Transactions <£=> 3 to 7, 136, 137,
 0r transfer of retail installment contracts, 10 
148 to 150. ALR 2d 447. 
79 CIS Supp. Secured Transactions § 5. Construction and application of statutory 
68 AmJur 2d 827 to 834, 839 to 846, Secured provision respecting registration of mort-
Transactions §§ 17 to 20, 23 to 27. gages or other liens on personal property in 
case of residents of other states, 10 ALR 2d 
Automobiles: priorities as between 764. 
vendor's lien and subsequent title or security Refiling when goods are removed from dis-
interest obtained in another state to which trict where contract is filed, 68 ALR 554. 
vehicle was removed, 42 ALR 3d 1168. Sale of contractual rights; defect in written 
record as ground for avoiding sale, 10 ALR 
2d 728. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Conditional sale of locomotive. though it was not executed and recorded as 
Formerly a conditional sale of a locomotive chattel mortgages are required to be. Lima 
was valid, as against vendee's creditors, Machine Works v. Parsons (1894) 10 U 105, 37 
P 244, applying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 2814. 
70A-9-104. Transactions excluded from chapter. This chapter does 
not apply 
(a) to a security interest subject to any statute of the United States 
to the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to and 
third parties affected by transactions in particular types of prop-
erty; or 
(b) to a landlord's lien; or 
(c) to a lien given by statute or other rule of law for services or mate-
rials except as provided in section 70A-9-310 on priority of such 
liens; or 
(d) to a transfer of a claim for wages, salary or other compensation 
of an employee; or 
(e) to a transfer by a government or governmental subdivision or 
agency; or 
(f) to a sale of accounts or chattel paper as part of a sale of the busi-
ness out of which they arose, or an assignment of accounts or chat-
tel paper which is for the purpose of collection only, or a transfer 
of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee who is also 
to do the performance under the contract or a transfer of a single 
account to an assignee in whole or partial satisfaction of a pre-
existing indebtedness; or 
(g) to a transfer of an interest or claim in or under any policy of insur-
ance or any contract for an annuity (including a variable annuity), 
except as provided with respect to proceeds (section 70A-9-306) and 
priorities in proceeds (section 70A-9-312); or 
(h) to a right represented by a judgment (other than a judgment taken 
on a right to payment which was collateral); or 
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to any right of setoff; or 
except to the extent that provision is made for fixtures in section 
70A-9-313, to the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on 
real estate, including a lease or rents thereunder; or 
to a transfer in whole or in part of any claim arising out of tort; 
or 
to a transfer of interest in any deposit account (subsection (1) of 
section 70A-9-105), except as provided with respect to proceeds 
(section 70A-9-306) and priorities in proceeds (section 70A-9-312). 
L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-104; 1977, ch. History: 
272, § 10. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1977 amendment deleted "3uch as the 
Ship Mortgage Act, 1920" after "United 
States" in subsec. (a); substituted present 
subsec. (e) for "(e) to an equipment trust cov-
ering railway rolling stock; or"; substituted 
present subsec. (f) for "(f) to a sale of 
accounts, contract rights or chattel paper as 
part of a sale of the business out of which 
they arose, or an assignment of accounts, 
contract rights or chattel paper which is for 
the purpose of collection only, or a transfer 
of a contract right to an assignee who is also 
to do the performance under the contract; 
or"; added the exceptions at the end of 
subsecs. (g) and (h); substituted present 
subsec. (k) for "(k) to a transfer in whole or 
in part of any of the following: any claim 
arising out of tort; any deposit, savings, pass-
book or like account maintained with a bank, 
savings and loan association, credit union or 
like organization", added present subsec. (1); 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation. 
Cross-References. 
Filing, when required to perfect secunty 
interest, 70A-9-302, 70A-9-401. 
Policy and subject matter of chapter, 
70A-9-102. 
Priority of certain liens arising by opera-
tion of law, 70A-9-310. 
Priority of security interests in fixtures, 
70A-9-313. 
Assignment of contract rights. 
Absolute assignment of contract right to 
past-due obligation to pay money constituted 
a security interest within the meaning of this 
section. Consolidated Film Industries v. 
-United States (1975) 403 F Supp 1279, 
reversed on other grounds in 547 F 2d 533. 
Collateral References. 
-79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 2. 
68 AmJur 2d 847 to 856, Secured Trans-
actions §§ 28 to 32. 
Charge for use of machinery, tools, or 
appliances used in construction as basis for 
mechanic's lien, 3 ALR 3d 573. 
Debtor's transfer of assets to representa-
tive of creditors as effectuating release of 
unsecured claims, in absence of express 
agreement to that effect, 8 ALR 3d 903. 
Mechanic's lien, taking or negotiation of 
unsecured note of owner or contractor as 
waiver of, 91 ALR 2d 425. 
Secured transactions: priority as between 
statutory landlord's lien and secunty interest 
perfected m accordance with Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 99* ALR 3d 1006. 
What constitutes "commencement of build-
ing or improvement" for purposes of deter-
mining accrual of lien, 1 ALR 3d 822. 
70A-9-105. Definitions and index of definitions. 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires: 
(a) "Account debtor" means the person who is obligated on an 
account, chattel paper or general intangible; 
(b) "Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence 
both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a 
lease of specific goods, but a charter or other contract involv-
ing the use or hire of a vessel is not chattel paper. When 
a transaction is evidenced both by such a security agreement 
or a lease and by an instrument or a series of instruments, 
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Promissory note. from to recover the debt. First Security Bank 
Security interest of plaintiff in assets J J g f v- Z i o n s F i r s t N a t B a n k (1975> ^ P 
transferred pursuant to bookkeeping entries * 
between two subsidiary corporations was not Collateral References, 
extinguished by the secured creditor's accep- Confusion of Goods <3= 8, 9,11. 
tance of a promissory note from the trans- 15A CJS Confusion of Goods §§ 3-9. 
feree, and such creditor was entitled to trace 69 AmJur 2d 378, Secured Transactions 
its security interest and the proceeds there- § 501. 
70A-9-316. Priority subject to subordination. Nothing in this chapter 
prevents subordination by agreement by any person entitled to priority. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-316. Collateral References. 
Cross-References. Secured Transactions G=* 147. 
Priorities among conflicting security inter- 7 9 C J S SuPP- Secured Transactions § 71 
ests in the same collateral, 70A-9-312. 69 AmJur 2d 342, Secured Transactions 
Variation by agreement, 70A-1-102 (3). § 478. 
70A-9-317. Secured.party not obligated on contract of debtor. The 
mere existence of a security interest or authority given to the debtor to 
dispose of or use collateral does not impose contract or tort liability upon 
the secured party for the debtor's acts or omissions. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-317. Collateral References. 
Secured Transactions <$=> 169. 
Cross-References. 79
 C J S Supp> Secured Transactions § 83. 
Assignment of rights, contract for sale, 69 AmJur 2d 28, 321, 339, Secured Trans-
70A-2-210. actions §§ 205, 465, 475. 
70A-9-318. Defenses against assignee — Modification of contract 
after notification of assignment — Term prohibiting assignment 
ineffective — Identification and proof of assignment. 
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not 
to assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in 
section 70A-9-206 the rights of an assignee are subject to 
(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and 
assignor and any defence or claim arising therefrom; and 
(b) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the 
assignor which accrues before the account debtor receives 
notification of the assignment. 
(2) So far as the right to payment or a part thereof under an assigned 
contract has not been fully earned by performance, and notwith-
standing notification of the assignment, any modification of or sub-
stitution for the contract made in good faith and in accordance 
with reasonable commercial standards is effective against an 
assignee unless the account debtor has otherwise agreed but the 
assignee acquires corresponding rights under the modified or sub-
stituted contract. The assignment may provide that such modifi-
cation or substitution-is a breach by the assignor. 
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the assignor until the 
account debtor receives notification that the amount due or to 
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(4) 
become due has been assigned and that payment is to be made to 
the assignee. A notification which does not reasonably identify the 
rights assigned is ineffective. If requested by the account debtor, 
the assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable proof that the 
assignment has been made and unless he does so the account debtor 
may pay the assignor. 
A term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor 
is ineffective if it prohibits assignment of an account or prohibits 
creation of a security interest in a general intangible for money 
due or to become due or requires the account debtor's consent to 
such assignment or security interest. 
History: 
272, § 26. 
L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-318; 1977, ch. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1977 amendment substituted "payment 
or a part thereof under an assigned contract 
has not been fully earned by performance" 
near the beginning of subsec. (2) for "pay-
ment under an assigned contract right has 
not already become an account"; substituted 
"that the amount due or to become due" in 
the middle of the first sentence of subsec. (3) 
for "that the account"; substituted "is 
ineffective if it prohibits assignment of an 
account" near the beginning of subsec. (4) for 
"which prohibits assignment of an account or 
contract right to which they are parties is 
ineffective"; added "or prohibits creation of a 
security interest in a general intangible for 
money due or to become due or requires the 
account debtor's consent to such assignment 
or security interest" at the end of subsec. (4); 
and made a minor change in punctuation. 
Cross-References. 
Agreement not to assert defenses against 
assignee, 70A-9-206. 
Assignment of rights, contract for sale, 
70A-2-210. 
Credit, right to draw under, transfer and 
assignment, 70A-5-116. 
Purchase of chattel paper and instruments, 
70A-9-308. 
Use or disposition of collateral without 
accounting permissible, 70A-9-205. 
Insufficient notice of assignment. 
WheFe bank did not deal directly with pur-
chaser, but relied on an officer of seller's cor-
poration who procured signatures on letters 
acknowledging assignment by delivering 
them personally to an unauthorized employee 
of purchaser who worked at a different build-
ing than the address printed on the invoices, 
the bank had not taken such steps as were 
reasonably required to inform purchaser of 
the assignments. Bank of Salt Lake v. Corpo-
ration of the President of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (1975) 534 
P 2d 887. 
Collateral References. 
Secured Transactions <&= 181, 185, 187 to 
191. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions §§ 88 to 
96. 
69 AmJur 2d 293 to 311, Secured Trans-




70A-9-401. Place of filing — Erroneous filing — Removal of collateral. 
70A-9-402. Formal requisites of financing statement — Amendments — Mortgage as financ-
ing statement. 
70A-9-403. What constitutes filing — Required statement — Duration of filing — Effect of 
lapsed filing — Duties of filing officer. 
70A-9-404. Termination statement. 
70A-9-405. Assignment of security interest — Duties of filing officer — Fees. 
70A-9-406. Release of collateral — Duties of filing officer — Fees. 
70A-9-407. Information from filing officer. 
70A-9-408. Financing statements covering consigned or leased goods. 
70A-9-409. Destruction of old records. 
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II. ORDERS OR THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FILMED 
Kay M. Lewis (Bar No. 1944) 
Mel S. Martin (Bar No. 2102) 
JENSEN & LEWIS, P. C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Foothill Thrift 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4981 
Od 1 ( 
DiC 11 '9^ 7 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STAKER PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION ) 




GERALD H. BAGLEY, individually ) 
and dba WEST JORDAN PROPERTIES, ) 
and FOOTHILL THRIFT, et al., ) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-7088 
Judge Russon 
Motion for Summary Judgment by Foothill Thrift and Loan 
c^me on regularly for hearing on the 9th day of November, 1987, 
at the hour of 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russonf pursuant to notice. Plaintiff was represented by its 
attorneys of record, Joseph C. Rust and Douglas E. Griffith; 
Defendant Foothill Thrift and Loan was represented by its 
attorney of record, Mel S. Martin of Jensen & Lewis, P.C.; and 
Defendant Utah Power and Light Co. was represented by its 
attorney, Rosemary Richardson. The Court having heard arguments 
of counsel, having reviewed the pleadings and file hereof, 
including the memorandums and affidavits filed by the parties, 
and being fully advised in the premises, determined that the 
nf\t */V* 1^  
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uniform real estate contract dated July 1, 1977, is clear and 
unambiguous and had not been modified by the parties course of 
dealing. Therefore, the Court now makes and enters its: 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
motion for summary judgment by Foothill Thrift and Loan is 
partially granted as follows: 
1. The uniform real estate contract, dated July 1, 
1977, by and between West Jordan Properties as seller and Staker 
Paving and Construction Co., Inc., as purchaser, is clear and 
unambiguous. 
2. The parties to the contract did not intend to 
modify the payment terms of the contract by their course of 
dealing and there is no evidence that the contract was otherwise 
modified. 
3. There is no remaining issue of fact as to the 
enforcement of the uniform real estate contract as written. 
4. When the purchaser under the contract was placed on 
notice of the assignment, March 22, 1985, the purchaser became 
bound to pay Foothill Thrift and Loan the balance owed pursuant 
to the terms of the real estate contract. 
5. The sole issue remaining for trial, as between 
Foothill Thrift and Loan and the Plaintiff, is to determine the 
balance that was owed under the real estate contract as of the 
date, when it was assigned, to Foothill Thrift and Loan, and when 
r\ I \s \ S 4< <3, 
- 3 -
Footh i l l no t i f i ed the P l a i n t i f f of the assignment, on or about 
March 22, 1985. /} ^ - . 
l i s
 / / cLy of fcfWtfsfisr', 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED t h i 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON H'.U'w; 
By Di-cuiy i ^ i k 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of November, 
1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Joseph C. Rust 
Douglas E. Griffith 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Barbara L. Maw 
Strong and Hanni 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Claude Curley 
Rosemary Richardson 
Utah Power and Light Company 
P.O. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Attorney for Utah Power and Light Company 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Backman, Clark and Marsh 
68 South Main, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Gerald H. Bagley, 
G. H. Bagley, Inc., and 
Gerald H. Bagley Family Partnership 
Steven E. Tyler 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
Kennecott Building, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 




Bryan W. Cannon 
Poole, Cannon & Smith 
360 Prowswood Plaza 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorney for Defendants Elmer and Lois Jensen 
Bruce A. Maak 
Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups 
Suite 1300, 185 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
Tracy Mortgage Company 
JQ CCt i~w M ^ 7 i 
0GC£16 
Minute Bool 4*ffr4i-l*» *J \ THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
1
—" County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
Pdintiff ~ ^ 
.
 a CASE NO: Crtf-IOtX 
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P. Atty: AMCC, SsAt+utt^ s 
D. Atty: YT^JL0^) 









• Default of Pltf/Deft Entered 
Date: (£uLT > / ^ / - / f t f ? 





• Custody Evaluation Ordered 
• Visitation Rights 
• Custody Awarded To 
• Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
• Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
• Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:. 
= Per Month 
Per Month/Year • Alimony Waived 
• Atty. fees to the 
• Home To: 
in the amount of • Deferred 
• Furnishings To: 
• Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
• Restraining Order Entered Against. 
. Automobile To: 
• Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $. 
• 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
G Divorce Granted To As. 
• Decree To Become Final: El Upon Entry • 3-Month Interlocutory 
• Former Name of . Is Restored 
• Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft. 
Returnable . Bail. 
• Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
witteritetic [3 Based on ri torvstipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, court orders 
^u^ti^) /XI^LCJ^^T^J tz ^Oyy ^SJHJ^UUJU <^U^*ixi^ )pLi^pf^d- nct^x^ 
i^*2 hjJ^^U^td. 
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Kay M. Lewis (Bar No. 1944) 
Mel S. Martin (Bar No. 2102) 
JENSEN & LEWIS, P. C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Foothill Thrift 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4981 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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GERALD H. BAGLEY, individually 
and dba WEST JORDAN PROPERTIES, 
and FOOTHILL THRIFT, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-7088 
Judge Russon 
Motion for Summary Judgment by Foothill Thrift and Loan 
came on regularly for hearing on the 9th day of November, 1987, 
at the hour of 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, pursuant to notice. Plaintiff was represented by its 
attorneys of record, Joseph C. Rust and Douglas E. Griffith; 
Defendant Foothill Thrift and Loan was represented by its 
attorney of record, Mel S. Martin of Jensen & Lewis, P.C.; and 
Defendant Utah Power and Light Co. was represented by its 
attorney, Rosemary Richardson. The Court having heard arguments 
of counsel, having reviewed the pleadings and file hereof, 
including the memorandums and affidavits filed by the parties, 
and being fully advised in the premises, determined that the 
MlClA R 
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uniform real estate contract dated July lf 1977, is clear and 
unambiguous and had not been modified by the parties course of 
dealing. Therefore, the Court now makes and enters its: 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
motion for summary judgment by Foothill Thrift and Loan is 
partially granted as follows: 
1. The uniform real estate contract, dated July 1, 
1977, by and between West Jordan Properties as seller and Staker 
Paving and Construction Co., Inc., as purchaser, is clear and 
unambiguous. 
2. No parol evidence will be allowed to modify the 
contract. 
3. There is no remaining issue of fact as to the 
enforcement of the uniform real estate contract as written. 
4. When the purchaser under the contract was placed on 
notice of the assignment, March 22, 1985, the purchaser became 
bound to pay Foothill Thrift and Loan the balance owed pursuant 
to the terms of the real estate contract. 
5. The sole issue remaining for trial, as between 
Foothill Thrift and Loan and the Plaintiff, is to determine the 
balance that was owed under the real estate contract as of the 
date when Foothill notified the Plaintiff of the assignment, on 
or about March 22, 1985. 
OOC^I^ 
DATED this A -a •'-day of December, 1987• 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON H1NDLEY 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of December, 
1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Joseph C. Rust 
Douglas E. Griffith 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Barbara L. Maw 
Strong and Hanni 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Claude Curley 
Rosemary Richardson 
Utah Power and Light Company 
P.O. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Attorney for Utah Power and Light Company 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Backman, Clark and Marsh 
68 South Main, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Gerald H. Bagley, 
G. H. Bagley, Inc., and 
Gerald H. Bagley Family Partnership 
Steven E. Tyler 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
Kennecott Building, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 




Bryan W. Cannon 
Poole, Cannon & Smith 
360 Prowswood Plaza 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorney for Defendants Elmer and Lois Jensen 
Bruce A, Maak 
Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups 
Suite 1300, 185 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
Tracy Mortgage Company 
I g l U - t t f * * 1 ^ I 
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Kay M. Lewis Bar No. (1944) 
Mel S. Martin Bar No. (2102) 
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Foothill Thrift 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4981 
M<\Y 2 1988 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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GERALD H. BAGLEY, individually 
and dba WEST JORDAN PROPERTIES, 





TRACY MORTGAGE COMPANY, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DECREE 
OF FORECLOSURE AND 
ORDER OF SALE 
Civil No. C85-7088 
Judge Russon 
Motion for Summary Judgment by Foothill Thrift and Loan 
came on regularly for hearing on the 11th day of April, 1988 at 
the hour of 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, 
pursuant to Notice. Plaintiff was represented by its attorney of 
record, Douglas E. Griffith; Defendant Foothill Thrift and Loan 
was represented by its attorney of record, Mel S. Martin of JENSEN 
fiOPcr^ 
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& LEWIS, P.C.; and Defendant Utah Power and Light Co. was 
represented by its attorney of record, Rosemary Richardson. The 
Court having heard arguments of counsel, having reviewed the 
pleadings on file hereof, including the Memorandums and Affidavits 
filed by the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, 
determined that there does not exist any genuine issues of 
material fact as between the Plaintiff and Defendant Foothill 
Thrift, concerning the allegations set forth in the Amended 
Complaint and those in Foothill Thrift's Counterclaim against the 
Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court now makes and enters its: 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
Motion for Summary Judgment by Foothill Thrift and Loan is granted 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed against 
Defendant Foothill Thrift & Loan, with prejudice, for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on its 
Counterclaim is granted, for the amount owed under the following 
described real estate contract, and for a Decree of Foreclosure 
and Order of Sale of the subject real property, described in that 
certain Uniform Real Estate Contract dated July 1, 1977, covering 
land in Salt Lake County, Utah, described as follows: 
Northeast quarter Section 27, Township 2 
South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
-3-
3. A Judgment for Decree of Foreclosure and Order of 
Sale is granted against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant 
Foothill Thrift, for the balance owing under the real estate 
contract ($98,471.84), together with 7 1/2 % interest per annum, 
accrued from July 1, 1984; until the Judgment is satisfied. The 
amount owed as of April 11, 1988, was $129,495.02. 
4. Pursuant to Paragraph 21 of the real estate 
contract, Plaintiff shall pay all costs and expenses, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee in an amount to be determined by the 
Court after review of counsel's affidavit, which costs, expenses 
and fee the Defendant Foothill Thrift has incurred to enforce the 
contract; further, Plaintiff shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including additional attorney's fees which may be incurred to 
proceed with enforcement of the contract. 
5. The real estate contract is a good and sufficient 
li£n upon the premises and may be foreclosed as a note and 
mortgage and the premises may be sold by the Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County subject to prior liens, easements, and encumbrances, if 
any, in accordance with the law and practice of this Court and in 
accordance of the laws of the State of Utah. 
6. The proceeds of said sale shall be applied first to 
the satisfaction of the accrued and accruing costs of this action, 
including attorney fees, and then upon the sum and sums awarded to 
Foothill Thrift; the surplus, if any, of monies received from the 
sale shall be accounted for and paid by the Sheriff to the Clerk 
of this Court subject to its further Order. 
-4-
7. In the event that the return of the Sheriff 
discloses a deficiency, then Defendant Foothill Thrift shall have 
Judgment against the Plaintiff for such deficiency. 
8. Any party may purchase the premises at the said 
sale, and the Sheriff may issue his certificate of sale and grant 
possession to the purchaser of the premises and the Sheriff shall 
have all proper process of this Court on that behalf at the time 
the Judgment is entered herein. 
9. All right, title, and interest of any party, 
claiming an interest adverse to the interest of Foothill Thrift, 
with the exception of prior liens, easements, and encumbrances, if 
any, shall be forever barred, save the statutory right of 
redemption. 
10. There being no matters left unresolved as between 
the Plaintiff and Foothill Thrift, and no just reason for delaying 
entry of a final judgment, entry of judgment is hereby ordered. 
DATED this rjj day of May, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
A CTT>—ZXJL 
ttSTRICT JUDGE ' V i g j 
H. DIXON HINOLEY 
Affidavits submitted: 
L a r r y Gran t *y «|L/"* <nn«v •^ uaputy cier^  
R i c h a r d Dover 
Mel M a r t i n 
G0C5SS 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the -?(J>rday of AfRiL' 1988, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment, 
Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Joseph C. Rust 
Douglas E. Griffith 
KESLER AND RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Barbara L. Maw 
Strong and Hanni 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Claude Curley 
Rosemary Richardson 
Utah Power and Light Company 
P.O. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Attorney for Utah Power and Light Company 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Backman, Clark and Marsh 
68 South Main, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Gerald H. Bagley, 
G. H. Bagley, Inc., and 
Gerald H. Bagley Family Partnership 
Steven E. Tyler 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
Kennecott Building, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorney for Defendant Magna-Garfield Employees' 
Thrift Plan 
Bryan W. Cannon 
Poole, Cannon & Smith 
360 Prowswood Plaza 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorney for Defendants Elmer and Lois Jensen 
n(M**z*z'? 
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Bruce A. Maak 
Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups 
Suite 1300, 185 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
Tracy Mortgage Company 
(l^^Qf^&/ 
III. CONTRACTS, ASSIGNMENT, DEED 

THIS IS A LEGAlU S.NDihG CONTRACT. IP NOT UNDERSTOOO. SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE.' 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, mada in duplicate this * s t day of J u l y , A. D., 1 » 2 Z -
by and between West Jordan Properties 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and S t a k e r P a v i n g & C o n s t r u c t i o n C o m p a n y , I n c . 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of 1 4 5 , 2 0 3 a c r e s 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of — S a l t L a k e
 s u t e of U u h > to-wit. 
Mora particularly described as follows: 
Northeast quarter section 27, township 2 south, 
range 2 west, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Salt Lake County 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum o f . r o u r 
Hundred Thirty-five Thousand Six Hundred Nine & no/10Q„1UF. ^ 435.609.00) 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order 
strictly within the following time., to-wit: E i g h t y - s e v e n Thousand Five Hundrefl 8 7 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 , 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of f 3 4 8 , 1 Q 9 . Q Q shall be paid as follows: 
$54,572.06 Annual Payment, due July 1, 1978, 
and each consecutive July 1st thereafter until 
paid in full. 
Possesaion of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 1 s t day of J u l y , 1 9 ' * . 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. In teres t shall be charged from July 1, 1977 
on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of s e v e n g
 p e r c e n t ( 
?<) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of . 
f 55,000.00 , „ o f . 
. with an unpaid balance of 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following n Q n e , 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loana secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceeds. percent 
*"«) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to tne amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred oy seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to m3ke application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay al) taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenanU and agreea 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the oayment of his obligations against said property. 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after . July 1, 1972, 




pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount ot not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or % ~ " • 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default In the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the. Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
in. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the same shall become due. or within 3 0 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
. days thereafter, the 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option ot the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto - r — — — 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to anjM^'d the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement hdve/rfereunto *i*ned their^Karnes, tb«7day and year 
first above written. /^r /s&lj ^^ s / 
Signed in the presence of ' 
r
 Buyer ' 












called "DIDDER"), organized and existing under the laws of the Slate of L ™ 
doing business as a corpora ion ^ ^ 
To the Bagley & Company . 
thereinafter called "OWNER"!. 
In compliance with your Advertiserne^rTor Bids. BIDDER hereby proposes to 
#. , , , . , - _ . . . ., . .• _ A Headway Improvements - West Jordan Industrial-
.form all-WORK for the construction x3t ""*"""> "*"" 1 - ~ ^ -
Park - No. 2 * 
in strict accordance with the CONTRACT DOCUMENTS, within the time set forth 
therein, and at the prices stated below. 
By submission of this BID, each BIDDER certifies, and in the case of a joint BID 
each party thereto certifies as to his own organization, that this BID has been arrived at 
independently, without consultation, communication, or agreement as to any matter 
relating to this BID with any other BIDDER or with any comDetitor. 
BIDDER hereby agrees to commence WGRKimder this contract on or before a date 
to be specified in the NOTICE TO PROCEED and to fully complete the PROJECT withir 
consecutive calendar days thereafter. BIDDER furthe 
agrees to pay as liquidated damages, the sum of S for each consecutive ca' 
endar day thereafter as provided in Section 15 of the General Conditions. 
BIDDER acknowledges receipt of the following ADDENDUM: 
*Insert "a corporation", "a partnership", or "an individual" as applicable. 
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF !c^» JZ &*? [] U^k E H [ P 3 Document No : 
FEDERALLY ASSISTED WATER ANO SEWER PROJECTS H >JT* H *A l\ H t " r* ft S.d: pag* 1 ol : 
BIDDER AGREES to perform all work described in the contract documents 
for the following unit prices or lump sum: 
BID SCHEDULE 
NOTE: Bids shall include sales tax and all other applicable taxes 
and fees. 
NO. ITEM UNIT QUANTITY UNIT PRICE TOTAL PRICE 
SCHEDULE A 
1.• Furnish and Provide to 
Site Untreated Base 
Course as Specified 
TOTAL, SCHEDULE A 
SCHEDULE B 
1. Place and Compact 6-
Inch Untreated Base 
Course, Complete 
2. Furnish and Place 4-
Inch Bituminous Sur-
face, Complete 
3- Cut and Remove Existing 
Concrete Curb and 
Gutter 
4. Furnish and Install 
,Concrete Curb and 
Gutter, Complete 
TOTAL, SCHEDULE B 
TOTAL, SCHEDULES A AND B 
AWARD OF SCHEDULES OF WORK 
The Contractor may submit a proposal for single, or all schedules. The 
Owner reserves the right to award each schedule as a separate contract, or as 
a combination of two or more of the above schedules, depending upon what is 
received and whatever condition is deemed to be in the best interest of the 
Owner. 
C.Y. . 4,900 
- C -
L.S. L.S. T..B. 10 ,976 .00 












/ / n / JZ> J-ss- <'•*->:?r /.l^r'?,*. tf'/s/t, fr'oa o 
Address 
T j i i t e T / 
License No. ( i f applicable): A *?• ~2,<?&£/ 
(SEAL - IF BID IS BY A CORPORATION) 
ATTEST: J\A MM _ _ _ 
^ ^ A C R K E M E N W made this —L21D clay m ,mnp
 i a B w , u > 
H between BAGLEY t COMPANY _ . hereinafter called "OWNER" 
id STAKER PAVING x- PONSTRTTPTTON rn doing business as (an individual.) w (a 
artnership.) or [a corporation) hereinafter called "CONTRACTOR". 
/ITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the payments and agreements hexein-
fter mentioned: 
1. The CONTRACTOR will commence and -complete the construction of 
Roadway improvements for Wftst Jordan Tnri,,ctr^i B , ^ ^
 ? 
2. The COxNTRACTOR will furnish all of the material, supplies, tools, equipment, 
abor and other services necessary for the construction and completion of the PROIECT 
lescribed herein. 
3. The CONTRACTOR will commence the work required by the CONTRACT DOC-
UMENTS within calendar days after the date of the NOTICE TO PRO-
CEED and will complete the same within calendar days unless the period 
tor completion is extended otherwise by the CONTRACT DOCUMENTS: 
4. The CONTRACTOR agrees to perform all of the WORK described hi the CON-
TRACT DOCUMENTS and comply with the terms therein for the sum of S _ _ _ . 
or as shown in the BID schedule. 
5. The term "CONTRACT DOCUMENTS" means and includes the following: 
(A) Advertisement For BIDS 
(B) Information For BIDDERS 
(C) BID 
(D) BID BOND 
(E) Agreement 
CONraACT (DOCUMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION Or Oocumenl N» 5 
. , c n mn cewCft PROJECTS A S ' t e f f l ?3£0lO>3 
(H) Payment BOND 
(I) Performance BOND 
(JJ NOTICE OF AWARD 
(K) NOTICE TO PROCEED 
(L) CHANGE ORDER 
(M) DRAWINGS prepared by 
numbered ihrough . and dated 
19 
(N) SPECIFICATIONS prepared or issued b y 
dated - 19 
(O) ADDENDA: 
No dated , 19 
No dated 19 
No dated 19 
No dated 13 
No . dated , 19 
No. , dated . 19 
6. The OWNER will pay to the CONTRACTOR in the manner and at such times as 
set forth in the General Conditions such amounts as required by the CONTRACT 
DOCUMENTS. 
7. This Agreement shall be binding upon all parties hereto and their respective 
heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed, or caused to be executed 
by their duly authorized officials, this Agreement in ( ) each of 
which shall be deemed an original on the date first above written. 












BY C ^ > ^ ^ ^ h ^ < ^ S ^ > 
Name 
pl*M*Tye«t 
Address x^-J^ 3. / . /<s>, * V ^ > ^<?-J- * 
Jk 'mn-A_ /J/*/- £Yo*e> 
Document No S 
41W/DU 
"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE." 
WHEN RECORDED REIXJRN TO: Foothill ^ i J ^ ^ i ^ m ^ ^ S ^ t . 84108 
THIS AGREEMENT, made in tht City ot J & U L k $ M .., Stott of Utah on tht ....i.?.&-.... day of 
JSixsiL 19...85. by and bttwtm .....jy.es.t..Jor.cldn..£r.QP.er.tifii. 
hereinafter referred to a t the assignors, and 
hereinafter referred to as the assignees. 
,fPP.thi..l.l...Thr.i.ft. 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, under date of Mlx.it . 19.7.Z..., ....Reit..Jp£dan...P.n.QP.?.r.i;.l?.$. 
, , a t sellers, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with 
rltaker . P a y . ^ 
as buyers, of rA!.t.Jr.3.?.§, Utah, which contract it delivered herewith, wherein and whereby the said sellers 
agreed to sell and the said buyers agreed to purchase, upon the terms, conditions, and provisions therein set 
forth, all that certain land, with the buildings and improvements thereon, erected, situate, lying and being in 
the County of . . . $ M L J r . a k e , State of Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
The Northeast Quarter of Section 27, Township 2 South, Range 2 West, 






EXCEPTING THEREFRCM THE FOLLOWING: 
(See Attached Exhibit "A") 
to which agr99m9r%l in writing, reference it hereby mode for ail of the terms, conditions and provisions 
thereof, and 
WHEREAS, the assignees desire to acquire from the assignors all of the right, title and interest of the 
assignors in said property above described as evidenced by said written agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby mutually agreed as follows: 
1. That the assignors in consideration of the Payment of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, assign to the assignees, ail their right, title and 
interest In and to said above described property a t evidenced by the aforesaid Uniform Real Estate Contract 
of .r..y.*.X....L\ , 19. / . / -« , concerning the above described property. 
2. That to induce the assigneet to pay the said sum of money and to accept the said contract, ond the 
rights obligation pursuant thereto the assignors hereby represent to the assignees as follows: 
a. That the assignors have duly performed all the conditions of the said contract. 
b. That the contract is now in full force and effect and that the unpaid balance of said contract it 
$...9&i.4.71...M with .interest paid to the . . . . 3 t h * day of J u l y . , 19..&4.. 
c. That said contract i t assignable. 
3. That in consideration of the assignors executing and delivering this agreement, the assignees cove-
nant with the assignors as follow*! 
a. That the assignees will duly keep, observe and perform all of the terms, conditions and provisions 
of the said agreement thot of to be kept, observed and performed by the assignors. 
b. Thot the assignees will save ond hold harmless the assignors of and from any ond ail actions, suits, 
costs, d o n ^ s s o ^ a i m s and demands whatsoever arising by reason of an act or omission of the 
ossig 
s hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and yoar 
H O m P Y T" ~ 
^ttSUCrc™ I9&I personally appeared 














RANT, the signer of the 
icknowledged to me By: 
Notary Publi^^/^^d^sion Expire, 
BLANK NO. 1 !•—• Q o«* no. co. — M»» »©. »»oo «*»V 
Residing in Salt Lake 
u 
•ALT LAftf CITY 
J^  IIS 11 
Property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
BEGINNING at a point South 0o27'56" East 359.6 feet along the East section 
line from the Northeast corner of Section 27, Township 2 South, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 0°27'56" East 
2275.08 feet aong the East section line to the East quarter corner of 
said Section 27; thence South 89056'39n West along the quarter section 
line to the East boundary of the Kennecott Copper Corp. Railroad Right-
of-Way; thence North 33°01' East 1160.6 feet along the East boundary of 
said railroad right-of-way; thence North 56°59* West 12.5 feet; thence 
North 33°01 East along the East boundary of said right-of-way to a point 
South 33o01' West 1150.7 feet from the intersection of the East boundary 
of said right-of-way with the North line of said Section 27; thence North 




J S ? 
f . -*\j l . w n m n v . i , nwTH.u. 
Return to: Foothill Thrift 1304 Foothill Dr. SLC, Ut. 84108 
Recorded at Request of foothill.Thrift.. 1304 Foothill Drive ..SLC....84.108.. 
at M. Fee Paid 5 
bv - — Dcp. Book Page 
Mail tax notice to Address 
Rcf.:. 
4063749 QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
West Jordan Properties, A Partnership 





Salt Lake City 
— - t e n — — 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
Salt Lake 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
«V The Northeast Quarter of Section 27, Township 2 South, Range 
r^  2 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, 
EXCEPTING THE FOLLOWING: 
.\ BEGINNING at a point South 0°27,56" East 359.6 feet along the East 
section line from the Northeast corner of Section 27, Township 2 
^ South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence 
^ South 0°27'56M East 2275.08 feet along the East section line to the 
% East quarter corner of said Section 27; thence South 89°56'39M west 
'•' along the quarter section line to the East boundary of the Kennecott 
Copper Corp. Railroad Right-of-way; thence North 33°01' East 1160.6 
feet along the East boundary of said railroad right-of-way; thence 
^ North 56°59' West 12.5 feet; thence North 33°01' East along the East 
boundary of said right-of-way to a point South 33°01' West 1150.7 
feet from the intersection of the East boundary of said right-of-way 
with the North line of said Section 27; thence North 63°26T10M East 
1353.8 feet to the point of beginning. 
W I T N E S S the hand of said grantor , this 12th. <jay 0f 
March , A. D. one thousand nine hundred and Eighy Five 
Signed in the presence of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COI'NIY or 
/ RS. 
On thr 12th. day of March 
personally appeared before me Gerald H. Bagl 
the signer of the within instrument, who duly nrknov 
same. 
M\ fuinmis-jion expires 




APPROVED FORM - UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
rORM ) 0 3 - OUIT CLAIM OECO- n l u » CO I S * N I M M M U I H t t . - . U I « H 
IV. CORRESPONDENCE 
J^SER 
5TAKEB PAVING AND 
INSTRUCTION CO. INC. 
I Construction Management Co. 
»O Box 27598 
>alt Lake City, Utah 34127*0598 
'elephone 
B01J_29>7500 
February 14, 1985 
Mr. Richard Sorenson 
Bagley Corporation 
P.O. Box 17230 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
R E :
 ' ^
E s ; a t e + A g ^ e m e n t - West Jordan Properties/Staker Paving 
a Construction Comnanv. in/* 6 
 p y, I c. 
Dear Mr. Sorenson: 
™tl \TS^%Zr i n d e b , e d T C S S °" t h i s * * — , as of ,hiS 
Very truly yours, 
Terr /R. White 
Cost Accountant 
TR A'/kkf 





Lake City, Utah 84108 
"' -0405 
March 22, 1985 
Staker Paving & Const. Co. 
1000 West Center St. 
No. Salt Lake, Ut. 84054 
Dear Sirs, 
This Letter is to notify you of the assignment to Foothill Thrift 
of the Seller's interest in a Real Estate Contract dated July 1, 
1977 between Gerald H. Bagley (West Jordan 
and Staker Paving & Construction Carpany r£r, rties) as Sellers as Buyers. 
You are hereby notified that all future payments on this contract 
are to be paid directly to Foothill Thrift, 1304 Foothill Dr. Salt 
Lake City/ Ut. 84108, 
We understand that the present balance on said contract is $98,471.84, 
with interest paid to 7-9-S4* The next payment of $54,577.06 is due 
en July 1, 1985. 
Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to myself at 
581-0405. 
Yours very truly, 
Foo 
Larry E. Grant 
Executive Vice President 
krm 
r~?a 
STAKER PAVING AND 
CONSTRUCTION CO INC 
A Construction Management Co 
PO Box 27596 
Salt U * t City. Utah 64127-0598 
Tt l tpnor* 
(8011 298 7500 
3uly 26, 1985 
3oseph Rust 
Attorney at Law 
Kesler & Rust 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, UT 8*111 
Dear Joseph: 
It was a pleasure to make your acquaintance the other day. As I 
mentioned at that time, we are concerned about our ability to obtain 
clear title to property we contracted to buy from Bagley Corporation 
some time ago. Bagley Corporation has just recently assigned this 
contract to Foothill Thrift and Loan. 
We had hoped to use the monies due to Bagley Corporation under the 
contract as an offset to monies they owe us, but that option has 
apparently been eliminated. Our main concern now is assurance that 
we can obtain clear title upon paying off the contract. Under the 
terms of the contract, two payments remain; one that was due 3uly 1, 
of this year, and one that is due in 3uly of 1986. If possible, we would 
like to maintain the present payment schedule, but would consider 
paying off the property this year if that is the only way we can have 
assurance that we will obtain clear title. 
I am providing the file on the property for your review and have kept 
a copy of most of the important documents for myself so we may 






cc: Bill Fillmore 
Val Staker 
Larry E. Grant - Foothill Thrift 
Ur» EXHIBIT F 
STAKER PAVING ANO 
CONSTRUCTION CO INC. 
A Construction Management Co. 
P O. Box 27596 




August 13, 1985 
Gerald H. Bagley 
d/b/a West Jordan Properties 
c/o Bagley and Company 
3690 E. Fort Union Blvd. #103 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
RE: Real Estate Contract Between West Jordan Properties and 
Staker Paving and Construction 
Foothill Thrift & Loan 
Gentlemen: 
As you are aware, we entered into a contract with Gerald H. Bagley 
doing business as West Jordan Properties for the purchase of the 
northeast quarter of Section 27, Township 2 Souths Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. That contract was dated July 1, 1977 
and provided for payments in the amount of $54,572.06 on the 1st of 
July of every year until the contract balance was paid. Under normal 
amortization schedule, the contract would have paid out fully with a 
final payment on July 1, 1986. 
As you are aware, Mr. Bagley has been accepting contract work 
which Staker Paving has done for him as offset payments. We have a 
number of letters in the file which reflect that agreement and the 
amounts of various the offsets. According to our records, as of 
January 1, 1985, we had an amount due and owing us by Mr. Bagley in 
excess of $110,000. 
This letter is to inform you that we have elected to offset monies 
owed us by Mr. Bagley against all monies owed on the referenced 
contract. According to our calculations, we were entitled to make 
that offset as early as January 1 of this year. Even assuming, 
however, an offset as of the date of this letter, the amount of the 
offset needed to make the remaining payments will be less than 
$106,000. Therefore, for the purposes of offset and to avoid any 
present dispute, we are agreeing to an offset against the amount 
owed us by Mr. Bagley in the amount of $106,000, subject to a final 
determination of the actual amount of that offset. 
We note that Foothill Thrift has made itself responsible under that 
contract by taking an assignment of the contract. It should be noted, 
however, that we never released West Jordan Properties from its 
obligations to us on the contract. Therefore, Mr. Bagley remains 
obligated under all of the terms and conditions, and Foothill Thrift is 
likewise and equally responsible under all of the terms and conditions. 
uiv» 
This letter is therefore a demand that we be given a warranty deed 
and title insurance as provided by the referenced reed estate 
contract. If you fail to deliver the same within ten (10) days of the 
date of this letter, we shall have no recourse except to bring legal 







EB i V 198b 
I f WIS. P.C 
JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
DOUGLAS E. GRIFFITH (4042) 
KESLER & RUST £»' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-9333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STAKER PAVING & CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
Plaintiff, 
v. 





TRACY MORTGAGE COMPANY, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF STAKER PAVING'S 
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
OF TRACY MORTGAGE COMPANY 
Civil No. C85-7088 
(Judge Russon) 
Plaintiff Staker Paving and Construction Company, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Staker Paving") hereby responds to third-party 
defendant Tracy Mortgage Company's Interrogatories as follows: 
Interrogatory No. 1: Identify each person with whom 
you contend that you entered into a contract for the performance 
-1-
Response No. 7; The following work was accomplished by 
Staker Paving on the property. 
1. Furnished, placed and compact six inch untreated 
base course, $10,976.00. 
2. 222,295 square feet, three inch asphalt, 2,058 cu 
at $50.00 per cu. $102,900.00. 
3. Concrete work: 17 2 L.F. curb at $4.20 per L.F., 
$722.40; 51 L.P. waterway at $15.95 per L.F., $813.45; 10,741 
L.F. curb and gutter at $4.62 per L.F., $49,623.42; 28 hours 
grading at $49.50 per hour, $1,386.00. 
4. Extras: 1,923.40 tons of road base installed at 
$4.54 per ton, $8,732.24. 
The prices quoted above are the contract and change 
order prices as agreed to between Staker Paving and Bagley and 
Company. The work began on October 10, 1984 and was concluded on 
November 15, 1984. Performance of all work and delivery of all 
items referenced above were completed between those dates. 
Staker Paving has received payments on this project totalling 
$64,553.34. 
Interrogatory No. 8: Identify each person having 
knowledge of the facts stated in your answer to Interrogatory No. 
7 and separately with respect to each such person, state the 
substance of his or her knowledge. 
-6-
V. DEPOSITION Gerald H. Bagley 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
STAKER PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, I N C . , A UTAH CORPORATION, 
PLAINTIFF, 
V S . 
GERALD H. BAGLEY, INDIVIDUALLY, 
AND D/B/A WEST JORDAN PROPERTIES 
AND D/B/A BAGLEY AND COMPANY, FOOTHILL 
THRIFT, MAGNA-GARFIELD EMPLOYEES 
THRIFT PLAN, ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, BAGLEY FAMILY 
PARTNERSHIP, CLAUDE CURLEY, UTAH POWER 
AND LIGHT COMPANY, G.H. BAGLEY, 
INC., ELMER JENSEN AND LOIS JENSEN, 
DEFENDANTS. 
NO. C85-7088 
DEPOSITION OF GERALD H. BAGLEY 
TAKEN: DECEMBER 19, 1986 
5258 PIN£MONT DRIVE MURRAY UTAH84107 
OUR FILE MO. 1 2 1 9 - 8 6 
^MOD^S. Certified Shorcnand Repor ters • 
9 COPY 
INTEKMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 


























Deposition of GERALD 
Plaintiff, at 36 South 
Beneficial Life Tower, 
H. BAGLEY, taken on behalf of 
State Street, Suite 2000, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 
19, 1986, commencing at 10 
MORSE, Certified Shorthand 
:00 a.m., before DANA MARIE 
Reporter, and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah, Pursuant to Notice. 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT 
BAGLEY: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT 
CURLEY: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT 
UTAH POWER: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT 
FOOTHILL THRIFT: 
ALSO PRESENT: 
DOUGLAS E. GRIFFITH, ESQ. 
Kesler and Rust 
36 South State St., #2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. 
Backman, Clark & Marsh 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
PAUL W. HESS, ESQ. 
Strong and Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ROSEMARY RICHARDSON, ESQ. 
JOHN M. ERIKSSON, ESQ. 
1407 W. North Temple, #339 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
KAY LEWIS, ESQ. 
320 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BURTON MAXFIELD 
1 negotiated them. I approved it, or I wouldn't have 
2 signed it. 
3 Q. Do you recall having any conversations with 
4 any representatives of Staker Paving in regards to this 
5 contract? 
6 A. Primarily most of my dealings are with Stew 
7 Staker. 
8 Q. Do you recall speaking with Stew Staker 
9 concerning this particular transaction? 
10 A. Not the specific time or place, no. 
11 Q. To your knowledge, prior to this transaction, 
12 had you ever entered into any sale of real estate to 
13 Staker Paving and Construction? 
14 A. I didn't understand that. 
15 Q. Have you ever prior to this transaction 
16 entered into any sale of property to Staker Paving? 
17 A. I don't know. I could have been. We sold 
18 some of my stuff, but I can't remember any. 
19 Q. Do you recall any other dealings with Stew 
20 Staker concerning the sale of property? 
21 A. No, not to my knowledge. It doesn't mean 
22 there wasn't some. 
23 Q. Do you recall how payment was to be made on 
24 this real estate contract? 
25 A. Just the document says $54,572.06 annual 
19 
II p c i y i n t r i l V. U l l J U I V J. 0.1X14 CCtWlA ^ U i w t w u v . j . v v . W U A ; * w v 
2 thereafter until paid in full. 
3 Q. Do you ever recall any other discussions about 
4 alternative methods of payment on this real estate 
5 contract? 
6 A. Not when we bought it. But from time to time 
7 — and I don't remember the specifics, like, did he walk 
8 in on September 2nd at 3 o'clock or anything like that. 
9 But I know at times when they were doing work for us, 
10 Stew would come in and say, we owe you $54 grand, can we 
11 take that out, because you owe us $54 grand or something 
12 like that. 
13 And so I do know — I don't know if it happened 
14 more than once or twice, but I do know that at times 
15 when we owed them money, at least that somehow or 
16 another the payments were offset once in awhile. 
17 Q. Okay. When you say when we owed, you're 
18 talking about Staker money? Then you, on occasion, 
19 would offset payments on this real estate contract; is 
20 that correct? 
21 A. Well, I think we have done it. I have a 
22 recollection of having done that once or twice. I don't 
23 know, because they did all our asphalt work. They did 
24 millions of dollars worth of asphalt work for us, and so 
25 it was kind of a logical thing to do. 
20 
1 discussions on offsets being made on this real estate 
2 contract were held between you and Stew Staker; is that 
3 right? 
4 A, Well, I don't recall anybody else that I can 
5 even think of their name that it would have been, but 
6 Stew. 
7 Q. At Staker Paving? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Was there anyone else working within your 
10 organization that could have talked with Staker Paving 
11 about making offsets? 
12 A. They would never — no one had any authority 
13 to do anything without checking with me on the trade, so 
14 they would have had to come to me. 
15 Q. Do you recall any of the persons you worked 
16 with within your organization coming to you and talking 
17 to you about trading work against this real estate 
18 contract? 
19 A. Well, it no doubt — that's no doubt how it 
20 happened. Somebody out there told somebody and they 
21 came to me and said, would you be interested in 
22 offsetting or something. But I donTt know — I can't 
23 remember specifically who it would have been. 
24 Q. Do you ever recall any discussions between you 
25 and Richard Sorenson concerning offsets on this real 
1 estate contract? 
2 A. Well, hefs the accountant that would have 
3 figured it out, so he would have been brought into the 
4 discussion. But I don!t recall any, where I would call 
5 him in to say, do we owe them this much and do they owe 
6 us this much? And if they want to do it that way, it 
7 will work or something-, so that's all it would have 
8 amounted to. 
9 Q. And this process in which offsets were made to 
10 this real estate contract, is what you've told me is 
11 that you would give the final approval on any of those 
12 offsets? 
13 A. Yes. No one would ever do that without my 
14 approval. 
15 Q. And besides G.H. Bagley Ltd., do you know of 
16 any other entities that may have had work in which was 
17 used to offset against this real estate contract? 
18 A. Well, in thinking where we laid asphalt, I 
19 can't think of — it could have been that in repair work 
20 or around those condos that there was some done at the 
21 racquet club, but I don't know. 
22 I can't remember, because we didn't do any other 
23 roads that I can think of. Well, we did Garden Valley 
24 roads, but I think that was earlier. It was a lot 

































At the offices of Foothill Thrift? 
Yes. 
Do you recall who else was with you at the 
had these discussions with Mr. Grant? 
I think Tom Bagley and Richard Sorenson were 
Do you recall if there were any monies still 
owed under the real estate contract at the time of the 
assignment? 
A. I assume there was. There wouldn't have been 





Do you recall how much? 
No. 
At the time you made the assignment to 
Thrift, did you indicate to them how payments 





Do you recall any discussions at the time that 
negotiating or discussing with Larry Grant this 






paid by offsetting work performed by Staker? 
No. 
You donft recall ever mentioning that? 
It wouldn't have been any of his business. 


























Q. Do you know what kind of work Staker performed 
for the second phase of the industrial work? 
A. Yes. It was asphalt for the roads. 
Q. Building a road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which entity would that have been owed to, or 
which entity's debt would that be? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you know which entity was at that time 
overseeing or performing the work out at the industrial 
park? 
A. Well, that portion of the park is not only by 
Gerald H. Bagley, so I don't know which entity was doing 
that. 
Q. It would have been one of these entities 
you've mentioned here today, though, that you hold an 
interest in? 
A. I couldn't say for sure. 
Q. Do you have any idea how much was owed for the 
work performed by Staker out at the industrial park at 
that time? 
A. Mo, I don't. There was a big squabble about 
it, because the work was never approved by West Jordan. 
So our engineers claim we didn't owe it until it was 
1 finished, and so there was a big hassle, because the 
30 
work was never finished and it!s never been approved to 
date, 
Q. Turning to the work at the industrial park, 
what was the first phase of the work being done out 
there at the industrial park? When did that occur? 
A, I'd have to get documents out and check dates, 
because I couldn't say for sure. It was several years 
before that, before the second phase. 
Q. Would it have been the late 70fs? 
A. It would have been the early 70's. 
Q. Do you recall which entity was overseeing the 
work performed out there? 
A. Gerald H. Bagley Ltd. 
Q. To your knowledge, did Staker Paving perform 
any work on the first phase at the industrial park? 
A. I thought they did, but I can't remember. I 
mean, do you think Staker did it? 
MR. MARSH: I don't know. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know either. I just kind of 
assume they did, but I don't know. Ifm assuming that 
they did. 
BY MR. GRIFFITH: 
Q. To your knowledge, was any of their work, if 
they had performed work out there, used to offset this 



























A. They were screaming for it. 
Q. What people are you talking about were wanting 
a road on that property.? 
A. Well, without the property, without the road 
going in there, they wouldn't have bought it. Who would 
go out in the middle of a field and buy five acres with 
nothing there and pay $25 grand an acre for it. Not in 
your right mind, you wouldn't. So the only thing that 
made that property worth anything was the road. 
Q. And so in selling these parcels of property, 
it was represented that they would have access to, a 
road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know if anyone talked to UP&L about a 
road crossing their property? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you ever have any discussions with any 
representative of UP&L? 
A. I'm sure I did. 
Q. Do you recall who it might have been? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. What is the current status of the road that's 
been put in out there? 
A. Well, it's unacceptable to West Jordan, so 
they won't accept it. So there it sits and they want us 
1 to rip it up. 
2 Q. Do you know what the reasons are for it being 
3 unacceptable? 
4 A, It won't pass any of the tests that the 
5 engineers put to it. 
6 Q. Do you know why it will not pass the tests? 
7 A, I've heard them discuss it. It has to do with 
8 the depth of the — the inadequate depth of asphalt, 
9 inadequate road base, holes that have developed in it, 
10 weak spots. Those guys at West Jordan can sit there for 
11 an hour telling you what's wrong with it. 
12 Q. What are you currently attempting to do to 
13 rectify the situation? 
14 A. We're trying to get West Jordan to decide what 
15 they will accept and we're trying to get it done to 
16 their acceptance. So far it's about $200,000 what 
17 they're quoting us. 
18 Q. Are you currently soliciting any bids for 
19 asphalt work to complete the road? 
20 A. Well, I'm not, but people involved with it 
21 are. 
22 Q. Who are those people? 
23 A. John Quist at Bush and Gudgell Engineering. 
24 MR. MARSH: Quick. 
25 THE WITNESS: Quick or is it Quist? It might be 
1 John Quick. 
2 BY MR. GRIFFITH: 
3 Q. What does this engineering firm — what's 
4 their relationship with this road, having this road put 
5 in? 
6 A. We just hired them is all. 
7 Q. They're working for one of your entities? 
8 A. Well, I guess you could say that. 
9 Q. Which entity? 
10 A. I don't know. 
11 Q. You say you've hired them, though? 
12 A. Well, Tracy Bank who has the mortgage on this 
13 will pay for this, if we can ever get it settled, what 
14 the city wants and what it costs. And so through Tracy 
15 Collins, they have authorized us to hire John Quick at 
16 Bush and Gudgell. And they're doing the work trying to 
17 get an agreement out of West Jordan of what they'll 
18 accept. West Jordan wants the whole thing ripped up and 
19 they're trying to convince them 'it's not quite 
20 necessary. 
21 Q. Tracy Collins holds the mortgage on this 
22 property? 
23 A, To my knowledge, yes. 
24 Q. The mortgage on which you or one of your 
25 entities are liable? 
1 represent Foothill Thrift. 
2 A. Foothill Thrift. 
3 Q. Right. You have before you Exhibit 4 
4 previously identified by yourself as the assignment of 
5 contract. It's true, is it not, that at the time the 
6 assignment was made, you, in fact, claimed that Staker 
7 Paving owed to you the $98,471.84 due on that contract 
8 at that time; is that correct? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Now, isn't"it also true that at the time the 
11 assignment was made that you had not authorized 'any 
12 offsets that would have reduced that figure? 
13 A. Not to my knowledge. 
14 Q. During the time that the contract was assigned 
15 to Foothill Thrift, isn't it also true that you did not 
16 authorize any offsets against the balance on that 
17 contract? 
18 A. That's true. 
19 Q. At the time that you entered into the 
20 assignment you, in fact, received consideration 
21 therefore and borrowed money from Foothill Thrift; isn't 
22 that correct? 
23 A. That's correct. 
24 Q. And you utilized that money for whatever 
25 business purposes you deemed to be in your best 
1 A. Now, state it again. I'm trying to be correct 
2 in my answer. 
3 Q. All right. At the time you pledged the 
4 contract to Foothill Thrift, that would have been July 
5 1st, or excuse me, the 12th day of March of 1985. 
61 A. Okay. 
7 Q. Isn't it true that all offsets that you had 
8 authorized had been given credit on the contract to 
9 Staker prior to that date? 
10 A. To my knowledge, yes, that's true. 
11 Q. And so at the time this was pledged, th^y did, 
12 in fact, owe the $98,000 and to your knowledge, they 
13 still owe on that less any payments they may have made? 
14 A. That's correct. 
15 MR. LEWIS: Thank you. One other question. Excuse 
16 me. 
17 Q. And you did not — and this is probably 
18 redundant, but I think it was your testimony that no one 
19 else in your organization had authority to grant offsets 
20 without your specific permission? 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 MR. HESS: Is it my turn now? 
23 (Whereupon Exhibit No. 5 was 
24 marked for identification.) 
25 
]J A. I'd have a map in my office showing which one, 
2 but I don't remember which one it is. 
3 Q. I believe you testified earlier, Dr. Bagley, 
4 that the road that is this darkened portion on Exhibit 3 
a crosses various parcels of property here. 
Q A. What do you mean crosses? 
7 Q. Well, that's what I want to ask you. What did 
8 you mean by that? Does this road actually cross 
9 property that you sold to other folks, or did you 
id dedicate this road? Let me ask that question first. Is 
id this a dedicated road? 
12 A. I'd have to ask my attorney. 
13 MR. MARSH: To my knowledge, it is, but I'm not 
14 absolutely certain of that, 
id BY MR. HESS: 
16 Q. You indicated that you have run into some 
17 problems with West Jordan. Is West Jordan insisting 
18 that certain work be done before the road will be 
19 accepted as a dedicated road? 
20 A. Yes. Accepted by them as a — when they 
21 accept it, then they have to accept, then they take care 
22 of the maintenance, but they won't accept it until it 
23 reaches their standards. And so the road to date hasn't 
24 been accepted, but somebody has done a legal description 
25 of that road. And that road is — the engineers had to 
1 have that, where they'd do it, so there's some 
2 engineers1 descriptions of the land with all that stuff. 
3 Q. Now, on Exhibit No. 5, the one I just handed 
4 you, the seller is shown to be Bagley Family 
5 Partnership. 
6 A. Okay. 
7 Q. You testified earlier that this property on 
8 the map was owned by West Jordan Properties, I believe. 
9 Do you know — 
10 A. Not this property. The other property in the 
11 industrial park. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. This is West Jordan Properties, but not — 
14 MR. MARSH: West Jordan Properties owned the 
15 property that was sold. 
16 THE WITNESS: Oh, did it? 
17 MR. MARSH: To Staker on this contract, Exhibit 1. 
18 Not this property. 
19 BY MR. HESS: 
20 Q. Okay. Do you know how much of this property 
21 was owned by Bagley Family Partnership as of January 18, 
22 1980? 
23 A. How much of this? 
24 Q. How much of the property in Exhibit 3. 




















Q. But it's possible no contact was made? 
A. No, I don't think it's possible. Ird be 
shocked if no contact was made. 
Q. But you're having difficulty producing 
evidence that contact was made and with whom. 
A. Well, we probably got about ten rooms of 
records so nobody has asked me to go pull one little 
piece of paper out of all that stuff. 
Q. So here I am asking you to do that. 
A. Yes. It might take awhile. 
MS. RICHARDSON: Thank you. That's all I have. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
Q. Mr. Bagley, I have just got some follow-up 
questions. The assignment that is shown as Exhibit 4 of 
the Staker real estate contract to Foothill Thrift, was 
that assignment made as collateral for a loan? 
A. I don't know. 
0. You don't have any refreshed recollection as 
to what the purpose of the assignment was? 
A. I mean, not that I could tell you for sure. 
Q. Was the assignment made on any conditions that 
Foothill Thrift would collect the monies represented to 
be owed by — represented on the document to be owed by 
Staker to Bagley upon a default or some other condition? 
1 A. Why else would they take it? I assume if they 
2 took an assignment that if some project went bad, they 
3 had the right to go collect the money. I mean, I donft 
4 know. Thatfs the only reason I!d assume theyfd want 
5 it. Why would they want it? 
6 Q. Do you know what project or which entity was 
7 first and foremost liable on the loan for which this 
8 assignment was collateralized? 
9 A. Well, they probably — if they got my name on 
10 it, why they'd come back to me through one entity or 
11 another anyway. 
12 Q. Have they ever attempted to collect any 
13 monies, Foothill Thrift, ever attempt to collect any 
14 monies from you or any of your entities for loans that 
15 have gone unpaid? 
16 A. I think they must have. 
17 Q. Do you know which entities that would be 
18 involved in that? 
19 A. No, I don't. 
20 Q. Would Mr. Sorenson know? 
21 A. Yes, Mr. Sorenson would know. 
22 Q. Did you have any legal counsel involved with 
23 you at the time you negotiated this assignment with 
24 Foothill Thrift? 
29 A. I don't know. 
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went to my father or anything like that. It was much less 
formal than that. 
Q Do you ever remember an occasion where Bagley o^ 
any of its entities owed money to Staker, and Staker made a 
oroposal that such monies, father than being paid by 
Bagley, be off-set o~> the real estate contract? Was there 
ever an occasion wnere you Disagreed with taking that 
option of off-setting rather than paying Stakers cash? 
A I wou^d think there possibly was one or more 
occasions where an off-set proposal was made that either we 
or Staker didn't agree to. I don't recall any specific 
instances but I recall in general that there were probably 
either proposals from us, "Let's off-set this", or 
proposals from us or from Staker that sa^d "Let us off-set 
this", and we say, "No, we pay or you pay." I know that 
there were times when we agreed to off-set and there were 
other times when we did not agree, either one s^ 'de or both, 
to the off-set. It was really Just on a case-by-case basis 
or year-by-year. 
QCan you tell mer if there were such occasions can 
you tell me why Bagley would be interested in making a cash 
payment to Staker Paving rather than accept an off-set on 
the real estate contract? 
A There migtvt have been occasions which I think 
there probably were, for example, on the Jeremy Ranch for 
13 
A For some of the entitles, yes. Normally, If we 
had the ability to pay our bills, we paid them. We didn't 
make a practice of trying to avoid paying b^lls If we had 
the ability to do 1t. 
0 So had you been able to pay 1t, you would have 
paid It? 
A I assume so. But I don't recall the 
circumstances surrounding this particular bill. There nay 
have been Questions on whether 1t was accurate. There may 
have been Questions on whether the money was actually owed. 
There may have been questions on the quality of work. 
There could have been a lot of different reasons why, even 
if Bagley had the ability to pay that they may not have 
paid . 
0 But you are not acquainted with any of those 
reasons? 
A Not soecifically but in working with contractors 
there were o^ten problems. 
0 But as to this invoice, you art not acquainted 
with any reason why? 
A I am not acquainted with t^he invoice directly. 
Like I say, I don't recall ever seeing this invoice, but as 
a general rule, we dealt with contractors for many years, 
and they always liked to be paid within five days of billing 
us and many times there was work that was either not done 
32 
properly or not completed properly and so forth and we 
always had to make sure that before we made our payments 
that the work was aone according to the way it was supposed 
to be done. So what I am saying is that it is possible that 
we had the funds available but for some reason or another 
the work wasn't done oroperly or it wasn't completed and 
therefore payment wasn't made. 
0 But all of that is speculanion, is it not? 
A Well, a lot of what I am telling you is 
speculation. 
0 You don't have any specific knowledge as to work 
that was being done out at the Industrial Park £2 by 
Staker, do you? 
A I didn't go out there and check up on the 
different contractors doing work out there. 
0 So you don't know whether or not Stakerrs work was 
completed at this ooint in time? 
A No, I don't for sure. Like I say, I didn't 
supervise on a day-to-day basis any of the contractors type 
work being done on any of the different projects, 
Q Regarding this Industrial Park £2, were you at all 
involved in the selling of, say, any of the properties out 
there to various individuals or entities? 
A On an indirect basis, 
Q Did you negotiate any of the contracts with any of 
33 
MR. MARTIN: Just a couple, Mr. 8agley. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MARTIN: 
0 I am trying to stretch your recollection of the 
events that took olace a number of years ago. With respect 
to t^ade-oayments— 
A Wno a^e you ^eoresenting, just so I will know? 
MR. MARTIN: My name is Mel Martin and I 
represent Foothill Thrift and Loan. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Martin): With respect to the trade 
payments that may have been exchanged between Stakes and 
the Bagley entities, did you ever think o^ feel that you 
had a legal, ethical, or moral obligation to accept trade-
payments in lieu of cash payments for those real estate 
contract payments? 
A No. 
MR. GRIFFITH: Ape you asking him for his legal 
opinion here, o^ do you want, his state of mind? 
MR. MARTIN: I asked him if he had any obligation 
whatsoever, whether it be legal, ethical, or moral to accept 
trade-payments in lieu of cash payments and if I understood 
his answer correctly, it was no, there was no obligation or 
you felt that you had no obligation. 
THE WITNESS: Not other than when we agreed on a 
37 
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be an industrial park. They wouldn't zone it for anything 
else. So that became known as 1:he West Jordan Industrial 
Park. 
Q Would it be correct to say that Gerald 8agleyr 
from the time that you came to be employed by him or during 
-the period of time that you were employed by him, was in the 
work of developing properties? 
A Yes, I think so, yes. He wasn't practicing his 
optometry profession at all, thatfs true. 
Q So he, and all of his entities, were essentially 
functioning as a developer? 
A That's correct. 
0 During the time that you we^e there, was it 
unusual for Dr. Bagley to, when selling properties, to take 
a construction company or a contractor to accept set-offs or 
off-sets, whatever you want to call it, for payments on real 
estate contracts? 
A Well, the only contractor that we actually off-set 
work for was Staker Paving. We did trade some with Harper 
Excavating. We did trade, occasionally, with other people 
when it was mutually acceptable. Like any developer, 
Dr. Bagley always experienced cashflow problems, and when a 
trade could occur that was mutually beneficial, yes, it did 
happen. 
0 So it was obviously in Dr. BagleyTs and his 
10 
entitles1 Interest to try and trade when possible? 
A When possible, yes. It depended on the terms. 
There were times when we proposed trades -to people and the 
-terms of the trade were too stiff. Normally when 
contractors wanted to trade, "they traded at a higher price 
because they weren't getting cash and 1t was much more 
difficult to control the work that was done, and so it was 
not done very often. 
0 I take it -Chen -that when 1t was feasible. 
Dr. Bagley and his entities attempted to work out a trade 
with real estate purchases? 
A Well, we didnTt discourage 1-t- . I donTt know if we 
tried to do it all of the time, but we d1dnTt discourage it 
if it was beneficial to' both sides. 
0 I realize that you didn't come to work for him 
until 1978, but to your knowledge prior to July 1st, 1977, 
the date of the purchase of the real estate by Staker 
Paving, to your knowledge had Staker Paving ever done any 
other work for Dr. Bagley, or any of his entitles, prior to 
that time? 
A I couldn't answer that accurately. I wouldn't 
know. I know they had a relationship, but I don't know. 
Q In the purchase of the real estate by Staker 
Paving from Wes-t Jordan Proper-ties, did you know who was 
involved in the neaotiation* of that contract? 
11 
know exactly how many. I know, at the time we negotiated in 
1980 or 1981, whenever that was, I believe there was 
actually two years of payments that were taken care of at 
that time. I think the next year a portion was traded, but 
not all- I don't remember, I think the next year it was 
actually Just paid. 
Q In general, do you remember whether there were 
more trade payments than cash payments under this contract 
or vice-versa? 
A If I had to guess, I would say that they were 
probably about equal, but I wouldnTt know without 
researching. 
Q How were the trade payments negotiated? 
A Normally when it came time for a payment from one 
side to the other, whether they owed us or we owed them, we 
would sit down and say, uDo you want to work a trade, or 
not?" 
Q Who is "we?" 
A Well, I don't know, sometimes it would be me 
talking with their controller or with Stu Staker, or 
sometimes it would be Stu Staker with our engineer. He 
would come in and ask me "Do you want to trade?"r or he 
would ask me what our position was. But if 1t was a 
situation when money needed to change hands, we would then 
sit down and make a decision whether or not we wanted to 
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-trade or not. 
Q Did you have authority to accept or authorize 
-trades against a real estate contract from Dr. Bagley? 
A I think that, not unilaterally, no. I think 
probably with some authority to say that we would accept or 
not, based upon our position, but normally I would tell him 
what we were doing to get his approval. 
Q Were there ever any occasions when you went to him 
requesting approval for a trade that he did not accent the 
trade? 
A Normally he asked me my recommendation and if I 
recommended that we trade, he went along with that. So I 
think that we understood where we were, and if it was 
beneficial and I thought it was beneficial and told him 
that, I don't remember any time that he said, "No, we are 
not going to trade." 
Q You don't remember an occasion where he went 
against your recommendation? 
A That's right. 
Q Do you remember who at Staker Paving you would 
discuss the trade with? 
A I can remember discussing trades with their 
accounting people. I don*t remember all of their names. I 
remember discussing it with Stu Staker on occasion. 
0 Do you know what Stu Staker's position is there at 
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Staker Paving? 
A I donft know. I assume he had some authority 
because he was usually the one that was in our office the 
most-
Q Did you ever meet Stu Staker? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you describe him to roe? 
A He is an older man, I had several talks with Stu. 
Q Over 50? 
A Yes. 
Q Over 60? 
A I don't know if he is over 60P he could be. He 
could be now. 
(Marked for Deposition Exhibit 8—Staker Ledger Sheet) 
0 (By Mr. Griffith): Mr. Sorensen, could you 
identify for us what has been marked as Exhibit 8? 
A This was our ledger sheet that was kept recording 
the payments and the balance owing on the contract. 
0 This was a ledger sheet kept by Bagley and 
Company? 
A Yes. 
Q Or by Bagley and any of his entities? 
A Right, actually by West/"Jordan Properties 
Q Do you know who prepared it? 
A This is my writing. It is probably a recap of 
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1 I older sheets because I was not employed during the first 
2 part. 
3 J Q Let's look at the first payment which appears to 
4 be a cash payment made November 3rd, 1977. 
5 I A That's correct. 
5 Q That is orior to your employment with Bagley; 
7 correct? 
8 A Yes. 
9 { 0 Do you know anything about this particular 
10 payment? 
11 J A I don't know. 
12 0 The second payment appears to be a trade payment; 
13 is that correct? 
U A Yes. 
15 Q And it references an invoice number. Do you know 
16 whose invoice that is? 
17 A I would assume that that is Staker Paving's 
18 invoice to us, to Bagley. 
19 Q Would that have occurred at the time when you were 
20 employed by Dr. Bagley? 
21 A Yes. 
22 0 Does that refresh your recollection as to when the 
23 first trade was made? 
2* A I believe what happened here was actually in about 
25 October of 1980 we went back and accumulated, at that time. 
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all of the balances that were owing various Staker entities. 
because I think, the concrete payment actually was to a 
different company than Staker, bun one that irhey controlled. 
It was at that point in time that we sat down and said 
••Let's take the total of all of these invoices and trade, on 
the date that they were billed." So we went back on the day 
Hhat they were billed, for example, -the first invoice was 
billed on April 9 of 1979, although we were negotiating the 
payment in 1980. We went back and I think this was the one 
I mentioned earlier where' we had traded approximately two 
years worth because the next payment came 1n 1982. So it 
could have been that we actually took care of the 1979, the 
1980, and 1981 payment 1n those trades. 
Q So from November 3rd, 1977, when the first cash 
payment was made, until that date when you went back and 
reconciled and accounted for all of the other payments, no 
actually payments had been made? 
A That's correct. As I remember what happened was 
as the work was being done by Staker and as payments came 
due on the contract, we mutually agreed that at some point 
in time we would sit down and off-set againsH either trade 
checks or whatever we decided to do. That is what we 
finally did in 1980 was we sat down and went over all of the 
invoices, all of *the work had been accepted, calculated, the 
amount that was owed on the contract to Wesi: Jordan 
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Properties and then worked an off-set on our books and on 
their books. 
Q Now, were there particular entities that Dr. 
Bagley had formed that were entitled to off-set, and others 
which were not entitled to offset against this contract? 
A No, I donft believe so. 
* 
Q It didn't really make a difference which entity It 
was? 
A That's correct. 
0 So when payments came due under the contract and 
I don't know if you recall when that was, do you recall when 
the contract required paymerrts? 
A It says here July 1st:, I believe that is when it 
was. 
Q For July 1st, 1978; July 1st, 1979, and July 1st, 
1980, you didn't make an actual reconciliation or 
acknowledgement of the payment on those dates? 
A No, we didn't. What we did is we went back, and 
it was by agreement, we went back and as the invoices were 
made, the date the Invoices were v^epared was the date that 
we counted as payment being made. So, for example, the 
invoice is dated April 9th, 1979 and on Hhat day we agreed 
to accept it as being paid because of the trade-. 
Q To your recollection, do you know what the second 
trade down. Invoice #13213, are you acquainted with what 
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that invoice related to, what work 1t goes to? 
A No, Ifm not. I know that 1t all dealt with 
asphalt and concrete work, at least to my knowledge. 
(Marked for Deposition- Exhibit 9 - Invoice #13213) 
Q (BY MR. GRIFFITH): I show you what has been 
marked as Exhibit 9. It appears to be a Staker Invoice, 
Staker Paving and Construction Invoice, Invoice 813213, 
dated July 31, 1979. 
On that Invoice there 1s a Job name and site. What 1s 
that? 
A It says West Jordan Industrial Park, 7200 South 
5900 West. 
0 At this particular point 1n -time 1n July of 1979 
do you recall, were you developing the West Jordan 
Industrial Park or a portion of 1t? 
A There was always work being done oun there and I 
wasn't that familiar with It. I didn't get that Involved 
with the actual construction that was being done and the 
different projects, so I don't know exactly what this 
relates to. 
0 But work was being done out there at the West 
Jordan Industrial Park at this time? 
A Yes, -there would have been. 
Q And this does appear, does It not, to have been 
off-set against the contract? 
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A Yes, it was. 
(Marked for Deposition Exhibit 10 - A Staker letter 
dated February 5, 1980, to Mr, Richard Sorensen) 
Q (BY MR. GRIFFITH): I show you what has been 
marked as Exhibit 10, and it appears to be a letter on 
Staker Paving letterhead to Richard Sorensen from Arlo W. 
Anderson, controller at Staker Paving. 
Do you recognize this letter? 
A Yes, I do. This was during this period of time 
that we were negotiating settlement on all of these 
contracts. 
Q I believe your previous "testimony was that you 
thought it would have been October of 1980. Does this 
refresh your recollection as to when this occurred? 
A Yes, I know that we continued on, so I think what 
we did is, we did this and then we obviously carried that on 
with the other trades that were possibly already in place, 
but I don't know. 
Q But there is -no reason to doubt that is an 
accurate date that you received that letter, sometime around 
February 5th, 1980? 
A I believe so. 
Q And this letter discusses the reconciliation of 
the payments to date? 
A Yes. 
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Q This third page of that letter is an accounting 
statement which reconciles the amount at that time due and 
owing down to $305,577.09. To your recollection were you in 
agreement with that summary? 
A Yes. . Well
 r -the actual principle balance was 
$295,277.69 and I think our balance, I think is reflected 
on that sheet 1n the last column. I think 1t is pretty 
close. 
Yes, it is on the left column on Exhibit 8, which 1s 
the ledger sheet. You notice that it Just about matches our 
balance there within a dollar. 
0 That 1s on line 5? 
A Yes. 
0 Once you reconciled"this account on February 5th, 
1980, did you continue then to communication back and fo^th 
with Staker Paving on a regular basis to reconcile the 
account? 
A Yes. There was work that went on during this 
period of time as well that* they were paid a significant 
amount of cash on, so we had ongoing relationship with 
Staker. This is not the sum total of the work that Staker 
did for us during that period of time. We had a good 
relationship with Staker, 
Q So they were receiving cash payments for -their 
work as well as off-setting this real estate contract? 
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A That's correct. As a matter of fact, there was 
one time that I wanted to trade very badly and they wouldn't 
trade because there was money that was owed on the Jeremy 
Ranch project, and I wanted to-off-set it against the 
contract because our construction draws were coming very 
slow and they were demanding money and finally I had, we 
worked out a situation where I had to pay anywhere from 
$5,000 to $10,000 a week and they would come in every week 
and pick up the check. When they came I asked them if there 
wasn't a way we could off-set this on the contract and they 
said no. So there were payments made regularly and that was 
a great deal of stress for me to have to, every week scrape 
up $10,000 to give them. 
Q When trade payments were made, how did you 
document those trade payments on your records? 
A Usually, I believe we had a file with all of the 
invoices in it, and we would just put it on the ledger as 
paid. I don't know if we would also send a letter out or 
they would send us a letter, but there was a lot of 
communication like this where we agreed upon what the 
balance was and what was being done trade-wise and what 
wasn't. 
Q Do you know if any of those ledger sheets still 
exist? 
A The old ones you mean? They might. I doubt it 
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because we have tried to go through and clean up the records 
and I'm sure that this Is when this was prepared and they 
wouldn't show anything different then this. 
Q This ledger sheet. Exhibit 8, then to the best of 
your knowledge. Is an accurate- accounting of this amount? 
A That's correct. 
(Marked for Deposition Exhibit 11 — A Letter on 
Staker Letterhead Dated July 31, 1980 to Bagley and Company) 
Q (BY MR. GRIFFITH): I show you what has been 
marked as Exhibit 11 and it 1s a collection of four 
different letters, all on the Staker Paving letterhead and 
all addressed to Bagley and Company, Attention: Richard 
Sorensen and all of them from a W.S. Ronne. Do you 
recognize these letters? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And do these letters appear to account for various 
off-sets that were going to be taken against the contracts? 
A Thatfs correct. However, this was not the 
communication of the off-sets that we had talked about with 
them and it was in the form of a document of what we were 
doing. 
0 Just to understand the procedure, when an off-set 
trade payment or an off-set would be taken would they 
initially communicate that by telephone or would you 
typically receive that in a writrten communication? 
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A It was usually either done by telephone or by Stu 
Staker in person when he was in our office. I mentioned he 
was in our office regularly. Sometimes it was communicated 
through our engineer who Stu worked very closely with and 
he would ask him to talk to us and see if we wanted to trade 
or how we wanted to work it. I would either call them or 
they would call me. 
Q Were there typically any time deadlines on when a 
trade payment could be accepted or requested? 
A Normally they seemed to occur about the time that 
payments were duef was when we would usually discuss themr 
what we were going to do for this year's payment, whether 1t 
was going to be a trade or whether it was cash. 
0 When you say payments were due, are you talking 
about the payments due under the real estate contract? 
A Well, both ways, when payments became due to them 
for work that they had performed or when payments came due 
under the real estate contract. So it we*s s-omething that we 
discussed regularly. 
Q When payments were due under the Staking invoices, 
that is, payments from Bagley and Company or any of his 
entities, due to Staker, the invoices stated that payments 
are typically due within 20 or 30 days of the date of -the 
invoice. Were communications typically made within that 
period of time or would they go beyond the due date due 
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1 under the invoice? 
2 A Well „ "they were done at different times. Some 
3 were done even before the work was performed. We needed 
4 work done and we could ask "for a bid with the understanding 
5 that it would be tirade work and others,, quite-often Stu 
6 himself would bring the bills in, the invoices, and at that 
I ' * 
7 point in time we would talk about whether these were trade 
8 or not trades and some could have even run over the 30 days, 
9 I donTt know. I don't remember. 
10 Q So -there wasn't any set procedure as -to when 
11 trades could be -taken? 
12 A No. 
13 Q Do you ever remember on occasion discussing 
14 whether interest would be charged to Bagley and Company for 
15 not executing a trade payment earlier, closer to the invoice 
16 date? 
17 A I don't recall any conversations about that, no. 
18 I don't think we ever did. We could have, but I don't 
19 recall that we did. 
20 Q You don't recall ever being charged interest? 
21 A It could be that there is interest on these 
22 invoices, but I don't know, 
23 Q When a trade would be done, would in typically be 
24 followed up by a letter similar to these in Exhibit 11? 
25 A I think in most instances they were. 
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Q Were there ever occasions when you followed up on 
a trade payment with a letter or was it typically Staker 
Paving? 
A I could have easily written them at the same time. 
I don't remember. I don't recall if I did or not. 
Q You don't recall ever doing that? 
A No. 
Q Do you know if any of the files currently with 
documents retained by Mr. Bagley and his entities will 
contain any such letters 1f they existed? 
A I would seriously doubt it. We wrote a 
significant amount of correspondence out of the office and 
I believe that most of them have been discarded. 
0 I believe if you take the accounting of your 
ledger sheet, there are ten trade payments made over the 
course of this contract and four cash payments. Did you 
receive Dr. Bagley's authorization on all ten of those trade 
payments, to your recollection? 
A I don't know if I specifically went and sat down 
on each one of them. I believe that at some point in time I 
made him aware of what I thought we should do and asked his 
approval and I believe he said yes, 
Q He was aware then that Staker Paving was off-
setting its real estate contract with the trade payments? 
A I believe so. 
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Q On a fairly regular basis? 
A I don't know if he felt: it was regular or not. He 
did not make a practice to stay very close to the actual 
accounting. 
Q Who was it that would be involved in seeking out 
Staker to do work for Dr. BagleyTs entities? 
A Primarily I believe.it was Mike Alldredge, who was 
our engineer at the time, that dealt with Staker. He had a 
son-in-law that worked for us named Dee Halverson who was 
also a contractor and the two of them would generally have 
contacted Staker to bid. Most of the communication that 
actually took place between our office and Staker's office 
was between the engineer, Mike Alldredge, and Stu Staker. I 
met their accounting people and talked to them for these 
purposes, but other than that there wasn't that much 
communication between us. 
Q Were the engineers that worked -for Dr. 8agley 
aware that they had the ootion to take an off-set on 
Stakerfs work? 
A Mike Alldredge was aware, yes, 
Q So that in negotiating on particular jobs they had 
the ability to discuss with Staker taking off-sets against 
the real estate contract? 
A Right. I think that oftentimes, as we bid jobs„ 
that was discussed up front, whether or not it would be a 
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1 trade or whether it would be a cash Job. 
2 Q To your knowledge, did Mr. Alldredge as the 
3 engineer have to go talk to Dr. Bagley to seek his approval 
4 prior to negotiating these types of arrangements with 
5 Staker? 
6 A I think primarily what he would do is negotiate it 
7 and then go ask Dr. Bagley if he approved and if he 
8 approved then they would go ahead. 
9 Q To your knowledge, was there ever an occasion that 
10 Dr. Bagley did not approve of taking trade with Staker? 
11 A No, I donft know of any time. 
12 Q I think I would like to refer you to the two final 
13 cash payments there that are noted here on your ledger 
14 sheet. Do you remember the circumstances surrounding either 
15 of those cash payments? 
16 A I don't now. 
17 0 With regard at least to the last one dated 7-1 of 
18 1984 in which the annual payment was made in cash, do you 
19 remember contacting Staker Paving and requesting 
20 specifically that they make that payment in cash rather than 
21 take a trade? 
22 A I could have, I don't recall doing that. 
23 Q Are you acquainted with an Individual at Staker 
24 Paving known as Bill Fillmore? 
25 A Yes, I have met him-
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Q Did you ever have any discussions with him? 
A Yes. As a matter of fact, now that you bring his 
name up, I believe actually, it was probably this payment 
because there was one payment that I went out and talked 
with Bill and Stu—no it was not Stu, Val Staker about the 
payment out at their offices and it was very probably this 
last payment. 
Q What was the gist of your conversation with them 
on going out there? 
A Just that we needed the cash, that we wanted to 
take the payment. 
Q * In cash rather -than in -trade? 
A Yes. 
Q Did they want to take the payment in trade? 
A They very well may have wanted to. I donft 
remember what the circumstances were. I don't think at the 
time that we had any outstanding invoices. 
Q Do you know if, at the time Staker was doing any 
work for Bagley or any of his entities? 
A They were probably doing work at -the Jeremy Rancy, 
but I am not aware of that because there was work done every 
year there. 
Q Do you know 1f they were under contract: to do any 
other work besides Jeremy? 
A I don't know 1-f they were or not. I wasn't very 
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this ledger sheet? 
A It could very well have been when we sold the 
contract to Foothill that: it was done for them, 
Q Do you recall specifically doing it in connection 
with that assignment? 
A I don't recall if I did ~fl: then, but it very well 
could have been. 
Q Do you recall who has seen "this? Do you recall 
whether Foothill Thrift had seen this ledger sheet? 
A ITm sure I gave them a copy of the ledger sheet as 
part of the sell. 
Q Would that have been Larry Grant:? 
A Probably, 
Q The last line under "cash payment" refers to an 
adjustment. What is that? 
A When I talked winh—I can't remember who it was at 
Staker, when I was confirming our balance with him, he had a 
difference, it was actually in our favorr and so I adjusted 
ours to agree with theirs. 
Q Do you how it was -that you spoke to that person at 
Stakers? 
A I don't. 
0 Was it over the telephone? 
A Yes, I believe so. 
0 And you donft recall who -ft was? 
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0 (By Mr. Griffith): You have had an opportunity to 
look at Exhibit 12. Do you ever remember seeing this 
document before? 
A No, I don't- That doesn't mean I haven't. 
Q Is there any reason that you would not have seen 
this particular invoice or that it could not have been 
given to you? 
A It very easily could have been. 
Q Could that have been given -to you? 
A Yes. 
Q In the operations at Bagley you would have 
ultimately been the one to receive this invoice; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Do you recall any discussions with Dr. Bagley or 
anyone at Staker regarding the payment of this balance on 
this particular work at the Industrial Park? 
A I don't, no. 
Q I believe, although 1H is hard *to see, payment was 
due December 31, 1984, twenty days following the date of the 
Invoice. Do you recall ever being told that this 
payment would be off-s-et on the real estate contract? 
A No; I don't. I really do not ever remember 
discussing 1t with anyone. The date of this invoice is 
A 
1 
right around the -time -that Dr. Bagley was losing control of 
34 
Q In-1 essence, by replacing him as the general 
partner, didn't they, in essence. Hake control from him? 
A They did take control from him, however, as I 
mentioned at first, he was on the Board of Directors and was 
the major spokesman on the Board of Directors. There was 
six directors on the board but every othe^ director were 
all representatives of the lending institutions, which were 
all back east, virtually knew very little about the project 
and as a result he controlled the board until such time as 
they asked him to be removed. 
Q At this point in time was Dr. Bagley and his 
entities having some serious cash flow problems? 
A As a result of the Jeremy, yes, we were because 
prior to this time most of the cash, a lot of the cash that 
supported his other operations came from the Jeremy. 
When the Jeremy was first started as an entity, it 
required a great deal of cash that Dr. Bagley borrowed from 
a lot of his other entities and at this point 1n time the 
Jeremy was repaying those debts. So the Jeremy Limited was 
a great source of cash flow. 
(Marked for DeDOsition Exhibit 16 - Staker 
Letter Dated February 14, 1985) 
Q (By Mr. Griffith): I show you what has been 
marked as Exhibit 16 and ask if you have ever seen this 
document before? 
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A Yes, I have. 
Q And will you Identify 1t for the record? 
A This Is a letter from Terry White, who Is an 
accountant for Staker Pavingr confirming the balance owed on 
the real estate contract. 
Q Dated? 
A Dated February 14, 1985. 
Q And It Is written to you; 1s that correct:? 
A That 1s correct:, 
0 Had you ever dls-cussed this with Mr. White before? 
A Yesf I had, 
Q Do you know what Mr. White's position at Staker 
Paving was at this time? 
A He was an accountant. He was one of the people 
that I had talked with on a somewhat regular basisr along 
with others concerning our respective business dealings, the 
cash that had to pass back and forirh. 
Q Do you know what authority he had as a cost-
accountant with Staker Paving? 
A I don't know, although I know that whenever, I 
think during this period of time, he was the one that I 
dealt with specifically on matters relating t:o our 
agreement. 
Q He, at least had access to the accounting records 
that would give you the balance due and owing; 1s that 
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correct? 
A That is correct. 
0 Did he have any other authority, to your 
knowledge, beyond that? 
A As I remember in talking to Stu on who I should 
talk to on accounting matters, that this is who I was 
referred to. So I assume that he had some authority. 
Q By "accounting matters", what do you mean? 
A I believe as far as the payments that needed to b 
made on their contract to us and on our payments to them, 
I'm sure at this point that Staker was owed money by the 
Jeremy Limited and that Terry White probably called me 
regularly to find out what was going to happen with their 
funds. 
Q Is *t your understanding that Terry White was the 
accountant that handled collections and payments? 
A I assume that was his role because that was the 
manner in which I dealt with him. 
Q Can you tell me in general what does a cost 
accountant typically do for a company?] 
A I would imagine, in my definition of a cosi: 
accountant, I donft know if it is theirs, but mine would be 
that he would be doing Job cosi: accounting for their 
projects. 
Q Do you remember the circumstances surrounding the 
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sending of this letter? 
A Yes, We had negotiated with Foothill Thrift and 
Loan to sell them the contracts -that were stnll owned by 
West Jordan Properties, We had several loans with Foothill 
Thrift that were due. I met with Larry Grant and discussed 
what we could do, what our options were and It was agreed 
upon that we would 1n facH sell them the contract that West 
Jordan Properties owned at that time. They were not placed 
anywhere else, they were free and clear. There was 
substantial equity 1n the contracts. He gave me a list of 
things that he would need In order for that to take place 
and one of them was a letter of confirmation from «ach of 
the contract, holders Indicating the contract balance. So I 
called Terry White and told him what I needed and why I 
needed It and he sent me the letter. 
Q It's your recollection that you told Terry White 
that you needed this letter In order to make an assignment 
to Foothill Thrift? 
A That's correct. Prior to this time we had never 
really sent letters back and fonrh Just to confirm a balance 
that was owed. Letters that had passed hands before always 
were to recognize payments or trade or whatever, but this 
was not a payment date. The whole purpose of this letter 
was to give to the bank—and I told that to Terry at the 
time. 
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Q Did you confirm that in a letter to Staker Paving, 
that the purpose for obtaining this letter was to make an 
assignment to Foothill Thrfft? 
A I donft believe I did because we were in a hurry 
to do it and I think all I did was call him on the phone 
and tell him what I needed and he said, "Fine, I will send 
it to you.M I don't think there was any concern at that 
time on what the balance was owed, and trhere was certainly 
no obligation to do anything different than that-
Q At the time this balance was owed on the note, did 
Bagley or any of his entities owe Staker Paving money? 
A By virtue of l:he invoice you have showed me, they 
obviously did and Ifm sure there was money outstanding on 
the Jeremy Ranch at the time because one of the big problems 
that we had at this point 1n trime was trying to get funds 
out of our constructions lenders on the Jeremy. So Irm 
sure there was funds owed Staker and several other 
contractors . 
Q Did you consult anyone other than Terry White at 
Staker Paving, to your recollection, regarding the 
assignment of this real estate contract: Ho Foothill Thrift? 
A I donft believe I did. 
Q You didn't discuss it with Stu Staker? 
A I don't recall trhat I did, I recall discussing it 
with Terry White but I don't recall talking about it with 
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anyone else. 
Q Why only Terry White? 
A As far as I was concerned the contract was ours 
and it was an assetr it was a receivable that we could do 
anything that we wanted to with. I didn't think we needed 
to get approval from Staker to assign it. 
Q Even though it was more than off-set by monies 
owed by Bagley to Staker? 
A I don't think that I put those two together and I 
don't think that we ever put those two together until such 
time as we ever sat down and discussed how we were going to 
handle payments. And I don't think at this point in time 
that I had any doubt or anyone else had any doubt that 
there would be a way to pay Staker whatever was owed them, 
as well as all of the other contractors that were owed 
money. So, I don't think that I would have looked at it as 
an off-setting balance. That was not the way that we 
normally did business. Our agreements with Staker were not 
such that we regularly kept track of who owed who what at 
any point in time to off-set. It was more done after the 
fact or before the fact: by mutual agreement and at this 
point in time I think that I would have recognized them as 
two separate complete things. 
(Marked for Deposition Exhibit 17 - Construction 
Management, Inc. Letter, Dated April 23, 1981.) 
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about an assignment? 
A Yes, because I called him specifically. This was 
an unusual request an my part to ask for a letter from him 
on a date, not an audit, not anything, asking for 
confirmation of the balance./ That was not the way that we 
had done things before. If I was Just interested in 
confirming what the balance was to make s-ure our records 
agreed, I would have called him up and said, "What is your 
balance?" 
He would have told me, and I would have said, "Great, 
that is what I have got, too." And that would have been the 
end of it. 
Q Getting to your discussion of the assignment, leu 
me show you what has been marked 1n a prior deposition as 
Exhibit 4. Does that appear to be the assignment of the 
contract of Staker Paving to Foothill Thrift? 
A I believe so, yes. 
Q Is that the assignment that you negotiated? 
A I believe so. 
Q And who did you have your negotiations with? 
A Primarily Larry Grant. 
Q Any others at Foothill Thrift? 
A I think he was the primary one that I dealt with. 
Q Was there anyone else that you dealt with? 
A There was another girl there named Donna Moore 
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that handled our loans and I could have talked to her about 
some of the items. She was kind of an assistant of Larryfs 
Q When did discussions begin regarding the 
possibility of obtaining a loan through the assignment of 
this contract? 
A Well, we had several loans with Foothill Thrift 
that were delinquent and Larry called me and said "Come in 
and letfs talk about it" and so I did. 
Q Do you recall when that was? 
A I don't. It was obviously towards the end of the 
year, either in January or February of 1985 or December of 
1984, somewhere in there. 
Q Did anyone else go with you? 
A Very possibly Tom Bagley was with me. 
Q When you went into talk to Mr. Grant the first 
time? 
A And we discussed basically what our options were, 
what could be done to bring the loans current. We told him 
that we didnrt really have anything that was, in i:he way of 
a free and clear property and that taking money out of the 
Jeremy at that point in time seemed not to be a possibility 
because of the events that we have already discussed. We 
told him that we had these contracts that West Jordan 
Properties owned, and there was substantial equity in them, 
would he be interested in taking them as additional 
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2 d o , t a k e them as an assignment : or w h a t And at: t h a t po i n t : 
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7 They bought the contracts and app lied the proceeds- against 
the balances owed on our loans„ wh ich eventual ly a 11 b e c a m e • 
9 :::!e 1 inquent and weren't co I lected on anyway. 
I 0 So yot J we re n ot o lbta i n i n g new mon ev on 11 \a 
1 1 « s'"- ^ q» ri e i"" t :'• b e f i i g ni a d e ? 
1 2 • A' I  i ::i), I t w a s t o pay off principle'and interest on 
13 outstanding 1o an s 
14 Q ii 1 I ii- h i I I Mi I i » iil I | in chased the 
1 5 c o n t r act r a t h e r t h a n r e ceiv e i t a s a c O' 11 atera 1 ? 
16 I A That's correct. 
17 ' 0 Over what period of time did these discussions 
*ake p I ace? 
1 9 j • A W e i 1 I doi i ' t: i r e c a l 1 exac t: 1 v wl tei i t:i ie l o a n s wei e 
2 0 due I w o u l d i mag i n e t.ha t i t: was p r o b a b 1 y du r 1 ng t: he mon t hs 
21 of January and February because this was dated the 12th day 
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24 Q Where did the discussions take place? 
25 A ' 1" ITI sure they were at Foothi I I I hr 1ftTs offices 
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0 And who was present? Was Tom Bagley always 
present with you during these discussions? 
A I don't know if he was all of the time, but Ifm 
sure he was some of the time. 
0 How often did you meet with Mr, Grant during the 
course of this? 
A ITm sure that there may be four of five different 
meetings that were held, 
0 Did you ever involve any of the debtors on the 
contracts you were assigning in your discussions with Mr. 
Grant? 
A There was one, a guy named Dale Jones. When I 
told him, I had to get from him also a confirmation and he 
gave it to me, but he was concerned as to what Foothill, 
whether Foothill would work with him as we had in the past 
on releasing prooerty because we had agreed prior with Mr. 
Jones to release prooerty sometimes when he hadn't paid for 
it in full because we had a very good relationship with him 
and he wanted to find out what Foothill's position was going 
to be. So prior to the closing of the loan I think he met 
with Foothill. 
Q Approximately how many contracts did you assign? 
A There was five or six-
Q Of those five or six contracts, were any erf the 
buyers of the real estate taking off-sets or making trade 
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0 The exhibit that we marked as 8r is 1t your 
recollection that you provided Mr. Grant a copy of that 
ledger sheet? 
A If it wasn't this oner it was one like it. 
Q He then was aware of the trade payments made over 
the course of this loan as outlined by that ledger sheet? 
A I would imagine so and I would imagine that as' we 
talked about those that I would have told him that that was 
something we did when it was mutually agreed, when it was 
what we wanted to do. The trade, in essence, was, I mean we 
would give them a check and they would give us a check, so 
as far as he was concerned value was being given. 
Q There were actual checks being cut? 
A We didn't cut them, no, but that was the way we 
actually accounted for them. We actually ran it through our 
books that way. 
Q As a check being paid? 
A So when we talk about the off-set, a trade, we did 
have trades actually during the course where we did trade 
checks, not with Staker but with other people. 
Q Was there ever a time when you cut Staker a check 
and they cut you a check with regards to payments on the 
real estate contract? 
A' Not on this, no. We had a good enough 
relationship with Staker that none of us felt like we needed 
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1 to cin that 
2 Q t * your books It: would ha\ e been run thi •ough— 
3 A herj* 
4- 0 - . ,J would have Ident i f ied I t as a check? 
5 A v -*•' - * w o u l d it would bp processed 1r i our books 
6 -5- IIIHMI I wi f I been IIIHW : in I a c a s h paymen t had 
7 v-e -ecelved. 
8 Q en I i fijeni i; m f i ed 'if o M r . Gi • ai i t: t: I ia t: S1:aker 
g D ? V-°~~ u?^ ^_ taking trade payments, did you Identify for 
10 — a :* -* .-w .cjue staker Paving by Dr. Bagley or any of 
11 
12 A I don't: know I f 1t: was discussed, As I mentioned 
13 at tnis H^UIU MI t irne we had outstanding invoices to se Erral 
1 4 r n n t T A r l - Q p c , 
15 0 - Grant even as I :;: you If any monies were owed 
1 6 * r h * 1" ni v,< fin f en t i I««I I I» he o f f •• s e t, by t, \ (•,» 
1 7 I w . — -. : t ? 
I 8 A I " m *; i.J i' e we had d i s c u s s i o n s on w h e t h e r or n o t t he 
19 - *-?""e t i ee ;iiml c, I ear -i, | whether there were any 
20 obligations to hinder the title or the value of the 
21 . ..,ar~~ , . .^ wol j]cj h a v e asked me that I wou Id have 
2 2 I war =i i v o t . • 
23 Q There was not what? • 
24 . A There was not any obligation to of*-9e? ami t:hi.-ii' 
25 the balance owed was actually owed. I donft think I wot i Id 
61 
have related any payments that we owed Staker on contracts 
or on work that was being done with their contract to us 
because the amount of work that Staker did far exceeded the 
balances that we are talking about on this contract. It was 
very normal for them to do several hundreds of thousands of 
dollars worth of work In a year and most of that was paid 
for In cash. So 1t wasn't like they would do $30,000 or 
$40,000 a year and we would have $50,000 on the contract. 
The amount of money that was actually paid to Staker every 
year was much greater than ever on the contract. The 
contract Itself was more a means to take care of smaller 
Items that were done. 
Q So you would have presumed at the time, or perhaps 
you did assume at the time that you made this assignment of 
the contract that Dr. Bagley and some of his entitles could 
very well have owed Staker Paving well 1n excess of this 
amount? 
A It Is very possible from the Jeremy Ranch alone 
that there was $200,000 or $300,000 outstanding but again I 
did not relate the two together at all. 
Q At the time that you negotiated this assignment, 
how could you have known that Dr. Bagley's engineer had not 
negotiated 1n getting a bid on work from Staker that work 
would be credited towards this real estate contract? 
A Ask me that again-
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see whether o r in o t h e h a d a 1 ready a 1 lotted amount s u n d e r 
A Any time that: Mike A" I Idredge negotiated a trade it 
^as normally before work was done and I would have known 
-. i)ou t: i t . 
Q You would have known about t: h e trade before t: h e 
work was actually done or the trade was actually made ? 
A 1 would have known that work was being done on 
t r a d e . 
Q E ver \ t- i rue? 
A Pretty normally, "that: was the way we did that. 
; [ here were t i mes that we di d 1 t af t er ., but 1 n most cases we 
negotiated t h e t r a d e p a y in e n t s b e f o r e " t f t e w o i , k was a c t u a I / 
done.. 
Q D f id \, o I i f n d i c a t e !:;: o M! • G r a f 11 \l( • o i i e r i w e 11 c c t j 1 d 
have owed Staker Pav fr ig mon ies at t h e t 1 me that you as s 1 g n e d 
the real estate contract? 
A I :l c i if t r e c a 11 s p e c i f 1 c a T I y s a y i n g t: h a t: i i c A. s I 
mentioned, the ma in thing we were concerned about: was 
whether :: i not the money was owed by Staker to West lor dan 
F i c) i: e! i: I e s a i \ d w! ) e t: t i e t o i • i i ::::) t: f t I i a d I:: 3 e \ i a s s if g i i e d a i i ) , w I i e i •  e 
or there was any obligation that would h1nder performance 
And, as far as I was concer ned, ther e was none 
Q And your opinion a lone was good enough for 
5 3 
Foothill Thrift, your assurance alone? 
A They got a title report. I don?t -think, as I 
mentioned, as far as I was concerned and I think as far as 
everyone 1n our office was concerned, the contract and any 
payments that were owed Staker were two complete different 
things. We had a contract receivable and we had contracts 
payable and we had amounts payable on work that was done, 
but we didn't, on our books or at any time mentally off-set 
them or anything of the sort. 
Q But In the course of your dealing with Staker 
Paving from 1979 through 1984 you had accepted trade 
payments on this real estate contract; 1s that correct? 
A We had accepted trade payments of $250,000 but at 
the same time we had probably made cash payments In evcess 
of a million and a half. 
Q But there was an established relationship 
between— 
A There was, on occasion, when we bo-th felt that 1t 
was mutually beneficial, we traded. 
Q You didn't answer my question. There was, at the 
time of the assignment, an established relationship between 
work being done by Staker and -the real estate contract; 1s 
that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q v Because through the course of the payments coming 
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due i n this rea 1 estate contract, trade payments had been 
accepted? 
A Again 1 ze—: 
Q Answer m» . ~-~~ ion. * Is that correct? 
A Yesr there had been an established pattern where 
was agreed upon by 
both parties times that I desperately wanted *• r. 
^nd Hhat created a great deal or 
prod c - . ;ecc-.^H **e had to fight like mad in ordpr to 
make payments *~ "* *"He^ oecause they would net trade So it; 
- that we had LU trade ur ihcu we 
were qeir: *~ ~ - *-^ - we agreed upon it beforehand and 
w« uuui ayi cwu _ was wnat we were going to do. It 
was not an establishec ^nnm erf "Vnn »n*» dc1"^^ wo^i/ ^^^ ^e 
o w e y o i j m one y a n d y o u ' * - s m c ^  e - & ' t - * ^  * *i 6? o f 
1
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1
: Igatlon t;-. ~.
 r - •- they har *•- "'ligation to do. 
0 w^s r^ere ever a t i'me during the course of 
!.-=?- oayments under this contract where Staker 
- ? - - equested ^ -rade payment and Dr. Bagley err his 
entities refusea ana specifically requested that thpy m.^l -P 
» a^,^ k payment? 
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1 A Well, as we talked previously, I mentioned the 
2 time that I went out and met with Val and Bill Fillmore, 
3 they talked about holding it off and trading and we said no, 
4 we needed the cash and they paid it. And there were 
5 similar times on the other side where we owed money to 
6 Staker and I was requesting a trrade and they refused and we 
7 had to pay them. So it was only when it was mutually agreed 
8 on both sides that 1t was beneficial that we actually did 
9 trade. 
10 Q And did you explain that whole process and 
11 procedure to Larry Grant? 
12 A I very well could have. I donTt recall if I did 
13 or not. Ifm sure I told him that there was no obligation on 
14 any of these contracts other than they were receivables that 
15 we had and they hadn't been assigned to anyone and they 
16 were free and clear as far as I was concerned. 
17 Q And he had required nothing more than your opinion 
18 in that regard? 
19 A He got a letter from each one of the contract 
20 holders an their letterhead stating what the outstanding 
21 balance was that was owed to us. 
22 Q And that was all that he requestedr that was all 
23 the assurance he needed? 
24 A I don't know— 
25 Q Did he request that you do anyfhing more to assure 
66 
Q But i OLi were unsuccessful? 
A That's correct. 
Q Subsequent to the assignment of the contracts, 
ha ve you had an v ot her discussions with foothill T hr i f t-
PegarcjTng those assignments since March 12th 1-85? 
A I Trn sure I have talked to them about •* but I 
don ? t reca 11 specif 1 ca Tl y a bout what I think La r-:' v 
f i id i ca t: ed t:o n i e t: II \e p i o I : I e r n 1 1 1t11 I i»•» w :n : ha', i nq w i t hi s- r--er 
col 1ecting. 
Q What: did he He 1 1 you? 
A That they were ^1*"Jm-fr^g an off-set 
0 What r - - . «:-*• the ! r c laim? 
A h t - * f t: f i e i • • =? w a s a w \ 1" t: t: EM i 
zc~t~"$7+: *-u?*: +-
 r *;: r~~-se- and I'm sure 1 wou Id ha e 
Q ' that discussion 
that you w- •- •-• •- . <> * Stakers claiming an 
off-set? 
' A I don f t be 11 eve so. 
Q Did he express any surprise at Stakers1 claiming 
an off-set? 
A I doi ift really recall the conversation -that 
- ** y 
0 f i i l l ! f- e»* p r pi;«:, ,>^ an leu f i, H*M r ds y o u t o r n o t 
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1 Q On Exhibit 8, is it fair -to state that the trade 
2 payments related to work that may have been done by or for 
3 other than the seller of that property which was West 
4 Jordan Properties? 
5 A I think they all were. 
6 Q So the t^ade payments could have arisen from work 
! * 
7 oerformed on behalf of any number of Bagley's companies? 
8 A That's correct. 
9 0 Were all of the Bagley companies essentially 
10 treated as one when it came to trade payments and the 
11 performance of the uniform real estate contract? 
12 A Well, the outside public viewed us as one entity. 
13 Internally separate records were kept for each entity, each 
14 entity filed its own tax return and had its own accounting 
15 systems. 
16 Q Internally, letTs talk about a trade payment on 
17 the uniform real estate contract with West Jordan 
18 Properties and let's assume that the work was done for 
19 Bagley Corporation. Would there be a internal accounting 
20 adjustment between West Jordan Properties and Bagley 
21 reflecting that West Jordan was now due money from 8agley? 
22 A Yes. We annually kept track of loans made to and 
23 from entities and interest was charged and payments were 
24 occasonally paid off. 
25 Q Exhibit 12 is the invoice that appeared December 
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1 "it*v i -;•.., wou id that have been the only outstanding debt: 
? due to Staker bv Bagle - companies? 
3 A ' 
4 Q v 9S. 
5 • A I dor v know t ha t, My o pi n i on wou i d be that: I 
6 d ^ d "imacpne tha t * t h e y wo^p owed m c" y by t h e 
7 J e ^ e ^ - . .. i m i t e d • ** • "*- - ~ ••-.- r : • _ _ *_ ..now - h a t f o r 
8 a f' a c t . • 
9 Q Do you know if any payment: was made by Jeremy 
10 I Limited or any other company to staker Paving after December 
1 1 | 11, 19 \i 4 ? 
12 'A. I believe 1 t- war I don't know tha+" for sure. 1 
1 3 am guessing , 
14 i Q * . M +-K^O« k^v/o k e e n a n y other trade payments on 
15 | a~>y C T - e * properties? 
I 6 A No. 
17 ^ f*l ! i i"» * - *-S a^"1 ~^ ~?* .- '-rf- t^e address of 9000 
1 
19 
sv woraan, is mat tne same 
DDerty than what- •?« associate-; ***"u fue 
20 w^ - ^ c - • -r* estate ccr*--?sct o+ .-. v ^-*--
2" A "* - * = a uifferent piece or p- •- y. 




that was- the subject o f the _ 197 7 contract that was used as a 
trade payment? 
A You mean on the property ^ u a t Staker purchased? • 
7 3 
Q Yes, 
A Staker took the property and used it as a gravel 
pit and by agreement with Dr. B^giey, they were allowed to 
do that. 
Q So, Staker— 
A So Staker, if there w^s any improvements done, 
Staker improved it, we didnTt. 
Q And they would have b^en in possession of the 
property and controlled the property using it for StakerTs 
business purposes? 
A That's correct. 
Q And so there was in essence no opportunity for 
any work done on the 1977 contract property to be used to 
trade payment on any other debt that was owed by Bagley's 
companies? 
A That's correct-
Q Are you familiar with the June 1984 road contract 
that is referred to as the Road Contract in this lawsuit? 
A No, ITm not. 
Q Do you know what trhat -fs referrina to? 
A Well, I assume that it
 W Q S a contract for the debt 
that we are discussing. 
Q And that was on -the Industrial Park? 
A I am assuming -that. 
Q And that is wholly unrelated to the property that 
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was sold in July of 1977? 
A ThatTs correct. 
Q The loan from Tracy Mortgage Company that is 
reflected in Exhibit 13 and I think you referred to it as 
the loan for approximately a million and a half dollars, do 
you know what I am talking about? 
A Yes, 
Q When was -that loan negotiated? 
A I don't recall exactly. It seems like it would 
have been in 1983 or 1984, possibly 1983 or 1984. 
MR. PROCTOR: Thank you, Mr. Sorensen. 
MR. MARTIN: Mr. Sorensenr My name is Mel Martin, 
and I represent Foothill Thrift and Loan. I would like to 
ask you a couple of clarification questions "firs-t. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MARTIN: 
Q During your previous testimony I believe Mr. 
Griffith asked you or made the statement and put it in the 
context that Mr. Stu Staker with Staker Paving had an option 
to take an off-set or trade payments or words to that 
effect. Did his use of the term "Had an option for taking 
an off-set", what would be your understanding of an option 
to take an off-set? 
A There was no option that one party could impose 
upon the other. The ootion was trhat it could be discussed 
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because the trades we^e never agreed upon unless they were 
agreed upon by both parties. 
0 In other words, it would have been requested by 
one side or the other? 
A Right. It was an option, I guess, that it had 
been done in the past and there was the possibility to 
discuss it. 
0 In your testimony you mentioned that where trade 
payments were accepted for work performed on the Industrial 
Park or other projects, you stated you never discriminated 
between projects or there was no discrimination between 
projects. 
A That's correct* 
Q What did you mean by that? 
A Well, there were not projects where work could not 
be traded, I guess is what I meant, that when we agreed to 
trade it didn't matter whether the work was done on the 
Canyon Racquet Club or up at the Jeremy Ranch or any of the 
other Bagley projects. It could have been done anywhere. 
Q Directing your attention to what has been marked 
as Exhibit 15, I will refer to that as the White 
confirmation letter concerning the amount of the debt on the 
contract to be $98,471.84, did -that number agree with the 
number that you had on your books at that time on that 
contract? 
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A I believe I was actually about $200 shorter than 
that and I didn't know why, possibly an interest difference 
but I was within $218 of Hhat balance. I think nhat was 
what I talked about before, that I had adjusted our records 
to agree with theirs. 
Q You stated that when Mr. Alldredge, the engineer, 
arranged for work to be performed by Staker in a trade 
situation or for trade payments, that agreement was normally 
made in advance. 
A It was very often made in advance. It wasn't 
always made in advance, there were times that we agreed 
afterwards to Urade but the normal procedure was that, here 
is some work that needs to be done and Staker has agreed to 
do it on trade. Should we go ahead and do it? 
Q Those occasions when you requested of Staker 
Paving to trade work and were denied that ability, was there 
any argument or discussions that there was an obligation on 
the part of either side to take trade payments? 
A Not an argument, it was more a pleading by me 
because at that point in time arranging for the cash to p.ay 
them was difficult and I requested a trade and I can't 
remember who I was working with at Hhe Hime, it might have 
bejen Arlo Anderson or this Ronne but they indicated that 
they had their own cash flow problems and that they needed 
the cash and they were not willinq to -trade at that point 
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in time. So I proceded to arrange to pay them. 
Q Do you recall approximately when that would have 
been, or the time frame? 
A It would have been 1n the 1982r 1983, 1984, 
somewhere 1n there. I donft remember exactly. 
Q Could it have been all three of those years? 
A There was one specific instance and if I had to 
guess I would have guessed that 1t would have been in 1983. 
0 At one point in your -testimony you mentioned that 
you may have paid one and a half million dollars in a twelve 
month period to Staker Paving. Do you have any recollection 
of what you might have averaged 1n payments to them from 
year to year? 
A I donft believe we actually ever paid them a 
million and a half in a year. I was referring to over the 
life of this contract that we had at least paid them that 
and that the amount of money that was paid in cash far 
exceeded the amount that was ever traded and that was the 
point I was trying to get across, that trades were done 
primarily on the small things and things of larger scope 
were paid in cash. That 1s the way we primarily did things. 
Q If I understood your testimony correctly, neither 
you or Mr. Alldredge would have ever unilaterally agreed to 
an trade-off without either trhe approval or concurrence of 
Mr. Bagley? 
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1 contractors wanting to trade it and we felt that the terms 
2 that they were calling for 1n the trade were unfair and we 
3 did pay cash because it was cheaper. 
4 Q But there was never a time when StakerTs terms 
5 were unfair and they were not accepted? 
6 A Not to my knowledge, but like I mentioned, we had 
7 a very good working relationship with Staker and actually 
8 got to the point where I think Mike Alldredge and Stu 
9 Staker basically negotiated contracts without getting bids 
10 from anyone else because they felt like they had such a good 
11 relationship. 
12 Q So there was never a reason to suppose for Staker 
13 that if they wanted to take a trade of+-set rather than 
14 receive cash payments from Bagley would turn them down; is 
15 that correct? 
16 A I would guess they could assume that. 
17 Q Could you foresee any reasons from knowing the 
18 working relationship that you and Bagley had with Staker, 
19 that you would ever turn down the opportunity to take a 
20 trade other than pay in cash? 
21 A Well, after we sold the contract, obviously we 
22 couldn't. 
23 Q But prior to the selling of the contract? 
24 A Wellr we owned the contract, if work had been done 
25 and the terms were fair I think we would have traded with 
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Staker on Just about any occasion. 
Q And there was no reason to assume that the terms 
would not have been fair with StaKer? 
A We had a good history with them. 
MR. GRIFFITH: Mr. Marsh/ls there anything that 
you would want to have put on the record? 
MR. MARSH: I have a couple of questions here. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MARSH: 
Q When you stated that you felt that Stakers could 
assume that trades could be made, I assume that was only 
after a reauest was made to trade, 
A That's correct. 
Q And approval was given by Dr. Bagley? 
A Thatrs correct. 
Q And in fact there was one occasion where they 
requested a trade and you refused and insisted on cash; is 
that right? 
A That's correct. It worked both ways. There was a 
time that they requested a trade and we requested cash, and 
in fact got cash, and there was a time that we reauested a 
trade and they requested cash and in fact got cash. The 
only time we traded was when we said 1t was a good deal for 
both of us and that was when we traded. 
Q So when you refer to an assumption 1t was an 
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assumption that you would discuss it and agree upon 1tr both 
parties? 
A That's correct. It was something that we had done 
in the past.-
Q The contract that was assigned to Foothill is in 
the name of what party, is signed by what entity? 
A ITm sure it would be West Jordan Properties. 
Q And that was a separate entity from Bagley and 
Company? 
A Yes. 
Q And the Bagley Family Partnership? 
A ThatTs correct-
Q From G.H. Bagleyr Inc.? 
A Yes. 
0 From all of the other entities? 
A .From all of the other entitles, it was an entity 
in and of itself that had its own books and records and 
filed its own tax returns. 
Q You were asked a question about why the payment of 
the balance due on the invoice which is Exhibit 12 was not 
made and I think you indicated that funds weren't available 
at the time. Were there other reasons why that invoice or 
that obligation was not actually paid? 
A Well, that was trhe primary reason, I know that we 
went to Tracy Collins and tried very hard to get them to pay 
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because we felt like it would enhance their collateral. 
Tracy Collins had thg work inspected and went to the city 
and tried to get the city to accept the work and the city 
would not accept the work. So we were unable to get Tracy 
to pay for it. We are still attempting to find out what 
can be done and trying to get Tracy to eventually pay for 
it. We haven't been successful in doing that. 
Q So is it fair to say that there is a dispute over 
whether or not the work was completed and properly done? 
A There is a dispute but it is not one that I donft 
think can't be worked out. 
MR. MARTIN: I have a follow-up question, if I 
might. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MARTIN: 
Q In follow-up to Mr. Marsh's questions where there 
were separate entities for whom the work was performed 
rather than West Jordan properties that had title to the 
property, were the bids given to and the contract with 
those particular entities between them and Staker Paving, 
did they ever reference the real estate contract dated 1977? 
A Did the bid contracts? 
Q Right. 
A I don't know, I haven't, I didnTt as a matter of 
course, ever see those. 
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0 Work performed by Staker Paving for one of the 
Bagley entities would have been paid for how, from whose 
checking account or whose banking account? 
A The funds were all maintained in a general banking 
account and allocated by off-sets. So the check would have 
looked the same but the accounting would have been different 
deoending uoon the entity that it was being done by. 
Q So it would have been paid by the entity for whom 
the work was performed? 
A That's correct according to the books and 
records, if they did work for the Jeremy Ranch, the Jeremy 
Ranch would, in essense, pay them for 1t and if a trade 
occurred, then that trade would be off-set against balances 
between balances owing between the Jeremy Ranch and West 
Jordan Properties. 
Q A final question, you previously testified that 
when the assignment o^ the real property or real estate 
contract was made to Foothill in 1985 that it was Bagley's 
position, your position that the contract was in good 
standing? 
A That's correct:. 
Q Is it true that at that time, March or 1985, no 
work either performed or being .performed by Staker Paving 
that would have been automatically entitled to a trade-off 
against that contract:? 
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A There had been no negotiation or no agreement to 
trade any work on any outstanding balances. When we sold 
the contract, we did It with the conscience that was clear 
that we had a receivable that was an asset that we were 
selling to try to reduce loan balances. 
MR. MARTIN: Thank you, that Is all. 
MR. GRIFFITH: We will close the record. 
(Whereupon the Deposition was concluded.) 
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July 31, 1980 
Bagley & Company 
P. 0. Box 17230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attn: Richard Sorensen 
Gentlemen: 
On July 14, 1980 King Con, Inc. billed you $18,732.54 for concrete 
work performed at the Racquet Club. 
King Con, Inc. is a sister company of Staker Paving & Construction 
Company and we would like to ask you to apply the total amount 
against the real estate contract Staker Paving has with you. 
I will assume this is acceptable to you unless I hear differently 
from you. 
Siotcexely, 
W. S. Ronne 
Vice President 
WSR/pw 
k DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 
September 8, 1980 
Bagley and Company 
P. 0. Box 17230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attn: Richard Sorenson 
Gentlemen: 
On July 21, 1980 we billed you $21,812.32 for asphalt work on your 
parking lot at 7350 South Wasatch Blvd. 
We would like to apply the total amount of this invoice against the 
real estate contract Staker Paving has with you. 
I will assume this is acceptable to you unless I hear differently. 
WSR/pw 
September 12, 1980 
PAVING ANO 
JCTI0NC0. INC. 
itn 500 Wtst _ - , „ 
tan 34020 Bagley and Company 
» P. 0. Box 17230 
10
 Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attns Richard Sorensen 
Gentlemen: 
On August 21, 1980 King Con, Inc. billed you $313.09 on invoice 
number 120457 for concrete work performed at the Racquet Club. 
King Con, Inc. is a sister company of Staker Paving and Construction 
Company and we would like to ask you to apply the total amount 
against the real estate contract Staker Paving has with you. 
I will assume this is acceptable to you unless I hear differently. 
Si^cprely, 
W. S. Ronne 
Vice President 
WSR/pw 
November 21, 1980 
Bagley & Company 
P. 0. Box 17230 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Attn.: Richard Sorenson 
Gentlemen: 
We have performed work for you on cart pads at the Jeremy 
Ranch and have submitted to you our invoice #14933, dated 
October 25, 1980 in the amount of $162,681.00. 
We would like to offset against that invoice the amount of 
$68,286.17 that remains to be applied against our real 
estate contract with you in order to meet our agreement of 
paying two annual payments on the contract this year. 
Enclosed is a schedule with the payments we have applied to 
the contract and the interest calculation we have made. 
We trust you agree with these computations and with the 
amount of $212,764.11 remaining on the contract. 
If you should have any questions, please feel free to 
contact me. 
Sincerely, 
W. S. Ronne 
Vice President 
WSR:nn 
encl. 
